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Abstract
On September 30, 2018, California became the first U.S. state to introduce a mandatory
board gender quota applicable to all firms headquartered in the state. Using a large sample
of publicly-listed firms headquartered in the U.S., we find that the introduction of the quota
is associated with significantly negative announcement returns to California-headquartered
firms. Consistent with the quota imposing frictions, this effect is larger for firms requiring
more female directors to comply with the quota. There is also evidence of spillover effects
to non-California-headquartered firms. We find evidence in support of two channels through
which these spillover effects operate: First, we find spillover effects to be larger for firms
operating in industries in which California-headquartered firms lack more female directors to
comply with the quota, suggesting that non-California-headquartered firms may lose valuable
female directors to California-headquartered firms. Second, we document negative spillover
effects for firms headquartered in states dominated by the Democratic Party, consistent
with the idea that these firms are more likely to become subject to a board gender quota
as well. Finally, we show that, already as of month-end November, female representation
on the boards of California-headquartered firms increased. Newly appointed female directors
differ significantly in terms of age, independence, and experience from incumbent and leaving
female and male directors.
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1 Introduction
Women are still heavily underrepresented in leadership positions in the U.S. corpo-
rate sector. According to Corporate Women Directors International (CWDI) 2018 report,
women hold 21.4% of director positions on the boards of the Fortune Global 200 compa-
nies. 19.5% of these companies have no female directors on their boards. In a country
comparison, the U.S. places fifth in 2018 with 26.3% female directors. This number is
surprisingly low, given that women in the U.S. account for about half of the employed
population (Bertrand, Black, Jensen, and Lleras-Muney, 2018). Furthermore, the fraction
of female directors in the U.S. is growing slowly, at an average rate of 0.5% annually. If no
proactive measures are taken and the current rate of growth remains unchanged, it would
take 48 years to achieve gender parity at U.S. boards.
In other countries with similar disparities, legislatures have responded to similar gender
inequality by adopting mandatory board quotas. The first country to act was Norway,
which introduced a gender quota of 40% female representation in 2003. Following Norway’s
lead, Belgium, France, Germany, Iceland, India, Israel, Italy, and Spain have all established
similar quotas. These quotas vary in the fraction of women to be appointed, the set of
firms that are subject to the quota, and the defined penalty for non-compliance.
In the U.S., California is the first state to adopt a mandatory gender quota. On
September 30, 2018, Governor Brown signed Senate Bill 826 into law. SB 826 requires that
all national and foreign companies headquartered in California have at least one female
director on their board by the end of 2019. Two female directors must be appointed to
boards with five members, and three female directors must be be appointed to boards with
six members or more by the end of 2021. The statute is non-criminal, but penalties include
a payment of $100,000 for the first violation, and $300,000 for each subsequent violation.
It is still an open question whether the quota is illegal as it may conflict with the corporate
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internal affairs doctrine as well as California and U.S. federal civil rights laws.1
The effect of gender quotas on firm performance, board structure and even their effects
on gender equality are uncertain. While, in theory, board quotas can be an effective
tool to improve gender equality, particularly if gender discrimination is the main obstacle
for women to climb the corporate ladder (Bertrand, Black, Jensen, and Lleras-Muney,
forthcoming), quotas have also been shown to lead to appointments of younger and less
experienced women to corporate boards with adverse effects on firm performance (Ahern
and Dittmar, 2012). The latter may result in a stigma put on so called “quota women”,
such that qualified women may still be reluctant to climb the corporate ladder even if
quotas would help them to push through. Moreover, Bertrand, Black, Jensen, and Lleras-
Muney (forthcoming, p. 1) find that seven years after the Norwegian quota fully came into
effect, “it had very little discernible impact on women in business beyond its direct effect
on the women who made it into boardrooms.”
This paper uses the passage of the California law to investigate a number of questions
related to the effect of gender quotas and passage of mandatory social laws applicable
to corporations. The first question we explore is how the introduction of a mandatory
gender quota affects valuation of California firms. We compute abnormal stock returns
for firms headquartered in California and a matched group of control firms for different
event windows surrounding the day of the gender quota law’s adoption and announcement
in California. We observe a robust and significantly negative valuation effect on stock
returns of firms affected by the California gender quota. Specifically, firms headquartered
in California have a 0.47% lower announcement return on the first day after the quota
announcement than a group of control firms matched on size and industry. This effect is
1 The internal affairs doctrine mandates that matters involving corporate boards are subject to the laws
of the state of incorporation, not where the headquarters are located. By targeting all firms headquartered
in California, the law deviates from the internal affairs doctrine. Moreover, Senate Bill 826 prioritizes one
gender over the other as well as gender over other aspects of diversity. Hence, the law may violate, among
others, civil rights laws.
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larger for firms requiring more female directors to comply with the quota and for firms with
low corporate governance standards. The results are consistent with the theory that smaller
firms and firms with inferior corporate governance could face more significant obstacles to
recruiting qualified women candidates. Our results are robust to changing the matching
procedure and they increase in economic magnitude for larger event windows.
In order to further examine the law and the implications of gender quotas, we examine
whether there are spillover effects to firms that are headquartered in states that are likely
to follow California. In recent years, California has frequently been the first State to enact
progressive legislation that was later adopted by other states in the U.S. as well. For
example, California pioneered legislation to promote reductions of carbon emissions from
road vehicles introducing a federal waiver to set its own emissions standards, along with a
zero-emission vehicle mandate. Thirteen states subsequently adopted California’s stricter
emissions standards.2 Other examples of California leadership involve renewable energy,
sentencing reform, and legalization of marijuana usage. It is reasonable to assume that
California’s actions on a mandatory gender quota may increase the likelihood that certain
other states will follow.
We adopt multiple strategies to examine the spillover effects on firms that are not
headquartered in California. First, we examine firms headquartered in democratic states,
which are arguably more likely to follow Californian legislation than republican states. We
find a negative, albeit weaker, valuation effect on firms in these democratic states, a finding
which can be interpreted as investors assessing a higher likelihood of mandatory gender
quotas being enacted in these states. In contrast, there is no negative market reaction
to the introduction of the gender quota for firms headquartered in republican states. We
also examine firms that operate in industries in which Californian firms need to appoint a
2 Known as the "Section 177" states, those 13 states are: Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, Maryland,
Massachusetts, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Vermont, and
Washington. See https://mde.maryland.gov/programs/air/mobilesources/pages/states.aspx.
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large number of female directors to comply with the quota. We also find negative spillover
effects on these firms, a finding which supports the arguments that the gender quota is
value-reducing because it increases the competition for scarce, experienced directors.
Finally, we examine whether the board composition of California headquartered firms
has changed in response to the new gender quota. We observe that, relative to control
firms, there are more women appointed to the boards of firms headquartered in Califor-
nia. Compared to month-end September 2018, California-headquartered firms significantly
increased female board representation by 0.36 percentage points two months after the in-
troduction of the quota law (i.e., as of month-end November). Californian firms that are
under more pressure to fulfill the quota, i.e., those that require one (two) female director(s)
to comply with the quota, have reacted more quickly to appoint female directors than a
sample of control firms headquartered in other states. On average, these firms increased
female board representation by 0.50 (0.55) percentage points two months after the intro-
duction of the quota. Some preliminary evidence on the skill set and experience of the
newly appointed female directors indicates that they are younger, significantly less likely
to possess industry experience or experience as (an outside) director of another listed firm
and less likely to be independent than incumbent female and male directors.
Previous evidence on the valuation impact of mandatory gender quotas is ambiguous.
While Ahern and Dittmar (2012) document a significantly negative drop in the stock price
of firms affected by the introduction of a gender quota in Norway, Eckbo, Nygaard and
Thorburn (2018) suggest a value-neutral effect of the Norwegian gender quota on affected
firms. The reason for these differing results may be that it is very difficult to establish
a proper control group to which affected firms in Norway could be compared (Ferreira,
2015). As all public limited liability firms (i.e., ASA firms) in Norway were affected by
the gender quota, control firms would have to be defined as either private firms (that are
structurally very different from ASA firms), or firms from neighboring countries or the
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U.S. We circumvent this problem by examining the impact of a gender quota within one
country, i.e., the U.S. where only firms in one state are affected by the quota, while all
other firms headquartered in different states can potentially serve as control observations.
Our results are in line with Ahern and Dittmar (2012) in that they show a significantly
negative short-term valuation effect of the mandatory gender quota. This finding is subject
to varying interpretations. One is directly related to the gender quota itself. The value
reductions we find may be attributable to investor assessment that the law will lead to
the appointment of less-qualified directors and subsequent firm underperformance. In our
tests we find evidence that this is the case, finding spillover effects in industries where
competition for directors is likely to be more intense and that firms reacting to the law are
appointing younger and less experienced directors to corporate boards.
On the other hand, the strong negative valuation results we find are somewhat surpris-
ing in that the law only requires the appointment of additional directors not the removal of
male directors. Another way to phrase this is that it is surprising that the simple addition
of one to three directors would change firm value so substantially. A second interpretation
of the results more in line with this skepticism is that the investor reaction is related to an
assessment of the willingness of California (and other similarly politically aligned states)
to impose non-economic legislation on firms headquartered in that state. Our results on
the effect of this law on smaller firms and those with low corporate governance standards
imply that firms which might be most affected by future legislation are impacted and also
give credence to this hypothesis. However, our findings on spillover effects highlight that
the gender quota itself has had some effect and that perhaps both hypotheses are at work
here.
Under either hypothesis, our findings suggest that non-economic laws with respect to
the corporation have economic effects. In the case of gender equality, studies have found
that proactive measures to increase female representation on all management levels within
5
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a firm seem to be crucial to achieve a sustainable increase of the fraction of women in
leadership.3 Gender quotas at the board level do not find this evidential support and
appear to be beneficial only to those women that are directly promoted to a board seat
due to the quota, but not to all other women in business who were not appointed to boards
(Bertrand, Black, Jensen, and Lleras-Muney, 2018).
2 The gender quota in California: Senate Bill 826
The Norway gender quota was introduced in 2003 and was followed by similar legis-
lation in other countries, primarily in Europe. For example, Germany, France, and Italy
established minimum gender quotas of up to 40 percent (see Table 1). In many of these
countries, the adoption of mandatory quotas was preceded by precatory resolutions which
called for companies to voluntarily increase female board representation.
In September 2013, California Senate Concurrent Resolution 62 was passed by both
houses of the California state legislature. This resolution was non-binding and called
for “every publicly held corporation in California with 9 or more director seats have a
minimum of 3 women on its board, every publicly held corporation in California with 5
to 8 director seats have a minimum of 2 women on its board, and every publicly held
corporation in California with fewer than 5 director seats have a minimum of one woman on
its board.” California was the first state in the U.S. to adopt such a non-binding resolution.
Legislatures in Illinois (May 2015), Massachusetts (October 2015), Ohio (April 2016),
Colorado (March 2017), and Pennsylvania (April 2017) all subsequently passed similar
resolutions calling for an increase in the fraction of female directors on corporate boards
in their states.
3 For example, slow career progression in the five years after the first childbirth has been shown to be
a major obstacle for women in business (Keloharju, Knüpfer, and Tag, 2018). A proactive measure that
mitigates this problem is government provided child care which allows women to preserve the value of
their human capital in child bearing years and helps them pursue their careers in spite of starting a family
(Chaochharia, Ghosh, Niessen-Ruenzi, and Schneider, 2017).
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The three-year time frame specified in the California resolution ended on December 31,
2016. On that date approximately 20% of the firms included in the Russell 3000 Index
and headquartered in California complied with the resolution’s targeted number of female
directors. As of June 2017, among the 446 publicly traded California headquarters firms
included in the Russell 3000 index, female directors held 566 (15.5%) of seats, men held
3,089 (84.5%) of seats, and 117 (26%) firms had no female directors.
Senate Bill 826 was introduced on January 3, 2018 with a stated purpose of addressing
the continued deficit in women directors at California publicly traded firms. The bill intro-
duced graduated requirements for women directors applicable to any publicly held domestic
or foreign corporation with its principal executive offices, according to the corporation’s
SEC 10-K form, located in California.4 The Bill generally requires between 25% (1 / 4)
and 50% (3 / 6) of female directors on the board. More specifically, the Bill requires that
these California firms have a minimum of one female director on its board by the end of
2019. The Bill also requires that, by the end of calendar year 2021, California companies
with five directors be required to have two women directors, and companies with six or
more directors are required to have three women directors.
The Bill provides an enforcement mechanism which applies financial penalties to com-
panies which do not comply. For a first violation, a fine of $100,000 is imposed; for a
second or subsequent violation, the fine is increased to $300,000. A violation is defined
as a “director seat required by this section to be held by a female, which is not held by a
female during at least a portion of a calendar year.” The maximum fine imposable under
the requirements of the Bill is $900,000 per year, the fine imposable for an all male board
with six or more directors. While this may be economically insignificant for most public
firms, we believe that there will be substantial pressure from institutional shareholders and
4 The Bill defines a Female director as “an individual who self-identifies her gender as a woman, without
regard to the individual’s designated sex at birth.”
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other constituencies for boards to comply with the law rather than simply pay the penalty.
This pressure would be applied more towards larger companies and those with high in-
stitutional ownership. For example, when Twitter had its initial public offering it had no
female directors and faced significant criticism; Twitter now has three women directors.5
Senate Bill 826 was introduced into the Senate on January 3, 2018 and had its first
hearing on May 7, 2018. The Bill first passed the Senate on May 31, 2018 (23:8:9 votes) and
the Assembly on August 29, 2018 (41:13:26 votes), and the Senate passed the amendments
made by the Assembly on August 30, 2018 (23:9:8 votes).
The Bill was presented to the Governor’s office for signing on September 10, 2018.
Governor Brown is known for his “willingness” to veto bills and vetoed 12% of bills in 2017
and 15% in 2016.6 He did not initially announce what he would do with Senate Bill 826
and news and commentary at the time highlighted that it was uncertain whether he would
sign the Bill.7 On Sunday September 30, 2018, SB 826 was signed into law by Governor
Brown and announced the same day.
Governor Brown signed the Bill despite significant commentary that it could be un-
constitutional (Grundfest, 2018). California’s own legislative analysis concludes that “the
use of a quota-like system, as proposed by this bill . . . may be difficult to defend.” The
argument for unconstitutionality has thus far focused on two grounds. First, that the Bill
violates the internal affairs doctrine since it purported to regulate firms incorporated in
5 See Claire Cain Miller, Curtain Is Rising on a Tech Premiere With (as Usual) a Mostly Male Cast,
The N.Y. Times, Oct 4, 2013.
6 Angela Hart, Jerry Brown consistently signs more bills than GOP governors, Sacramento Bee, Oct.
17, 2017. See also Tim Arango & Jose A. Del Real, 5 Takeaways from California Gov. Jerry Brown’s Last
Bill Signing Session, The N.Y. Times, Oct. 1, 2018 (Governor Brown has a “willingness to wield the veto
pen”).
7 David Matsa, Norway’s quota for women on boards suggests an overlooked benefit—to workers,
Quartz, Sept. 28, 2018, available at https://qz.com/work/1406503/if-california-mandates-a-gender-quota-
for-company-boards-it-could-be-good-for-workers/ (“Governor Brown has not indicated whether he will
sign the bill.”); Jorge L. Ortiz, Gender quotas: California ponders breakthrough bill to boost female execu-
tives, USA Today, Sept. 18, 2018 (“As California Gov. Jerry Brown ponders whether to sign a landmark
bill...”).
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Delaware or another State and headquartered in California. Second, that the imposed
quota violates the U.S. and California Constitutional equal rights protections. In his sign-
ing statement, Governor Brown stated “there have been numerous objections to this bill and
serious legal concerns have been raised.” Nonetheless, Governor Brown asserted that “it’s
high time corporate boards include the people who constitute more than half the ‘persons’
in America.”
3 Data and sample
3.1 Sample selection and data sources
To compile our sample, we first select all firms in Compustat with a data entry within
one calendar year before September-end 2018, the date of the introduction of the gender
quota in the state of California. We drop utility and financial firms (SIC codes 4940-4949
and 6000-6999, respectively), firms with missing information on the state in which they
are headquartered, firms headquartered outside the US, firms with negative book value of
equity, and firms with missing financial control variables as described below. Moreover, we
drop firms that only list American Depository Receipts (issue IDs 90 or above) and firms
without a listing on NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ (stock exchange codes 11, 12, and 14,
respectively). This initial sample selection results in a sample of 2,562 firms that enter the
sample with the most recent fiscal year-end balance sheet data in Compustat that predates
September 30, 2018. 475 firms are headquartered in the state of California and the other
2,087 firms in one of the other 49 US states or the D.C.
To analyze the market reaction to the introduction of the gender quota, we supplement
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our sample with stock return data from Compustat.8 Compustat reports more than one
return series for 172 firms (6.7% of the sample). In these cases, we chose the time-series
with the highest market capitalization as of the event date among those return series with
sufficient data to run the market model.
Governor Brown signed the law on Sunday, September 30, 2018. On the same day,
the adoption of the law was publicly announced. Hence, the first trading day, and thus
the event date, is Monday, October 1. We compute daily abnormal returns (ARs) for a
symmetric five-day window around the event date. Abnormal returns are computed as the
observed return less the predicted return from a market model regression estimated over a
250-day estimation window that ends on Friday, September 21, i.e., six trading days before
the event date and four trading days before the start of the event window. As a proxy
for the market return, we use the return of a self-computed, value-weighted market index
consisting of all sample firms. For a firm to be included in our final sample, we require at
least 125 daily return observations during the estimation window and complete return data
during the entire five-day event window. We are unable to compute abnormal shareholder
value changes around the announcement of the quota’s adoption for 100 firms, resulting in
a final sample of 2,462 firms, out of which 456 are headquartered in California and 2,006
are headquartered in other states of the US or the D.C.
Additionally, we compute a set of alternative cumulative abnormal returns (CARs)
over different sub-periods within the five-day event window. Our base case measure of the
market’s reaction to the introduction of the gender quota is a two-day event window, which
8 At the time of writing, daily stock return data from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP)
are only available through the end of June 2018 and the update schedule provided by the Wharton Research
Data Service (WRDS) suggests that daily stock return data from CRSP covering our time-period will not
become available until August 2019. Moreover, the CRSP-Compustat matching table necessary to merge
CRSP and Compustat is only available through January 2018. In order to analyze whether there are
any material differences between CRSP’s and Compustat’s return data, we compare return observations
in January 2018, the one month in our estimation window for which matched data are available from
both databases. We find that only 298 out of 43,349 return observations (0.7%) differ by more than 0.01
percentage points, suggesting that return data in CRSP and Compustat are very similar.
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includes the event day (October 1) and the following day (October 2). All abnormal return
measures are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles to mitigate the effect of outliers.
Some of our tests require detailed data on the board of directors of our sample firms.
We obtain board data from BoardEx. BoardEx includes detailed information on current
and past employments, education, involvement in non-profit organizations and club mem-
berships, among other things, on almost all directors serving on boards of publicly listed
US firms. BoardEx is updated daily and organizes its data at the director level. This
allows us to observe a firm’s board structure at any point in time and, thus, to analyze
how board structure changes in response to the introduction of a gender quota. Moreover,
we can track individual directors over time and across firms. This enables us to construct
detailed measures of directors’ work experience and to construct measures of directors’
connections to other directors or top executives (e.g., Custódio, Ferreira, and Matos, 2013;
Engelberg, Gao, and Parsons, 2013).
3.2 Descriptive statistics
Panel A of Table 2 reports descriptive statistics for the sample of 2,462 firms. 456
firms (18.5%) have their headquarters in California. On average, sample firms have total
assets of almost USD 6.4 billion, carry 22.1% of assets as long-term debt or debt in current
liabilities, have 22.0% of assets invested in property, plant, and equipment, invest 8.4% of
total assets per year in research and development, and achieve a return on assets of -1.8%.9
As of September 30, our sample firms have a mean (median) board size of 8.1 (8.0), out of
9 The return on assets (ROA), defined as operating income before depreciation and amortization scaled
by total assets, is surprisingly low when compared to the median of 8.6%. As ROA is winsorized at the
1st and 99th percentiles, this suggests that the sample is comprised of a substantial number of firms with
strongly negative ROA values. In unreported tests, we find this pattern not to be an artifact of our sample
selection or variable construction. Specifically, we find similar numbers when computing ROA as net
income scaled by total assets (mean: -9.1%; median: 1.8%), when using EBITDA scaled by total assets
(mean: -1.8%; median: 8.6%), and when winsorizing ROA at the 5th and 95th percentiles (mean: -0.1%;
median: 8.6%). Moreover, we find even more negative (winsorized) ROA values when looking at the entire
cross-section of Compustat firms (mean: -31.4%; median: 4.1%).
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which 15.3% (14.3%) are female directors. The quota imposed on firms headquartered in
California mandates that firms have to have, by the end of the calendar year 2021, three
female directors if board size is six or more, two female directors if board size is five, and
one female director if board size is four or less. Using data on board size and directors’
gender, we find that, at the time of the adoption of the quota law, 84.0% of all firms are not
in compliance with the mandated quota that would apply to the current board size (2021
requ. failed (d)). To comply with the quota, firms would have to appoint on average 1.5
(median: 2.0) female directors (# female directors missing), or, if expressed as a fraction
of board size, would have to increase female board representation on average by 21.4%
(median: 22.2%) to comply with the gender quota (Shortfall (%)).
3.3 Construction of matched control sample
In most our tests, we compare the reaction to the quota of treated firms, i.e., firms
headquartered in California, with the reaction of a sample of control firms, i.e., firms
headquartered in the other 49 US states or the D.C. The validity of such tests rests on
the assumption that the two groups of firms are comparable before the onset of treatment.
Prior research looking at the Norwegian gender quota, which affected all public limited
companies (ASA) in Norway, had to resort to private limited liability companies (e.g.,
Matsa and Miller, 2013; Eckbo, Nygaard, and Thorburn, 2018), listed firms from other
Scandinavian countries (e.g., Ahern and Dittmar, 2012; Matsa and Miller, 2013), or listed
US firms (e.g., Ahern and Dittmar, 2012) as a control group. Both, foreign and privately
held firms, constitute imperfect control groups as they are subject to, for example, different
corporate governance (guidelines) and regulation. On top of that, foreign firms even differ
in terms of the macroeconomic environment (Ferreira, 2015). A major advantage of our
setting is that we can draw control firms from a large pool of listed domestic companies
with headquarters in another US state or the D.C.
12
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To obtain treatment and control groups that are similar in terms of observable financial
and in particular board characteristics, we apply alternative matching procedures to define
a sample of control firms. Our first matching procedure, which serves as a base case,
consists of choosing, for each of our 456 treatment firms headquartered in California, three
non-California-headquartered firms that share the same primary two-digit SIC and are
closest in terms of total assets. We match with replacement, i.e., a firm in the control
sample may serve as a matched control firm to more than one treatment firm, but we
include every control firm only once in the sample. The resulting final sample comprises
1,233 firms, 456 in the treatment group and 777 in the control group.
Balancing tests reported in Table OA.1 in the Online Appendix show that this match-
ing procedure indeed results in a control sample that is similar to the treatment sample
in terms of board characteristics. Specifically, the results in Panel A, which compares
California-headquartered to all non-California-headquartered firms in the full sample, show
that California-headquartered firms are not only significantly different from non-California-
headquartered firms in terms of financial control variables, but also have smaller boards
and require more female directors to comply with the quota requirements. Panel B of Ta-
ble OA.1 compares California-headquartered firms to the matched control sample. While
differences in financial controls are reduced, all but firm size, which is a matching charac-
teristic, remain significant at conventional levels. More importantly, however, differences
in board structure and requirements to comply with the quota turn economically and
statistically insignificant. To address concerns of differences in financial controls between
California-headquartered firms and non-California-headquartered firms, we conduct ro-
bustness tests in which we control for these observable financial firm characteristics. Our
results hold.
In other robustness tests, we use several alternative matching procedures. For example,
we use propensity score matching to identify for each firm in the treatment sample the three
13
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closest matches from the subsample of non-California-headquartered firms.10 Alternatively,
we only choose the single closest propensity score matched firm, reducing the size of the
control sample. We also conduct robustness tests in which, for each firm in the treatment
sample, we select one non-California-headquartered firm that shares the same primary two-
digit SIC code and is closest in terms of total assets. As in all matching procedures that
we employ, we allow one specific control firm to serve as a matched control to more than
one treatment firm but include any control firm only once in our sample. Finally, we also
conduct robustness tests in which we use all non-California-headquartered firms as control
sample. In general, results are very insensitive to the use of alternative control samples.11
4 The impact of the gender quota on firm peformance
4.1 Main results
To analyze the market reaction to the introduction of the quota, we estimate market-
adjusted firm value changes at firms subject to the quota and, in order to control for con-
current effects, compare them to market-adjusted firm value changes at firms not subject
to the quota. To this end, we regress different abnormal return measures on a treatment
indicator, that is, a dummy variable set equal to one if a firm’s headquarters are located
in the state of California and zero otherwise. Standard errors are robust and clustered
by two-digit SIC code level. The event date is Monday, October 1, 2018, the first trading
day after the public announcement of the quota by the Governor’s office. The announce-
ment was made on Sunday, September 30, after the Governor had signed the law earlier
that day. In our baseline setting, the sample consists of all California-headquartered firms
10 Propensity scores are estimated using the following explanatory variables: ROA, Leverage, ln(Total
assets), PPE / AT, R&D/AT, and 2-digit SIC code industry dummies.
11 We have also experimented with the addition of common support constraints by means of a restriction
imposed for differences in total asset assets (+/- 50% of the California-headquartered firm) when using
industry-size matching or by adding a caliper restriction (0.01) when using propensity score matching.
Applying such restrictions leaves our results virtually unchanged.
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that pass the filters described in Section 3.1 and three industry- and-size matched con-
trol firms per treatment firm as described in Section 3.3 (with replacement and avoiding
double-counting). Daily abnormal returns are computed as the observed return minus the
predicted return from a market model regression estimated over a 250-day estimation win-
dow that ends on Friday, September 21. As a proxy for the market return, we use the
return of a self-computed, value-weighted market index consisting of all sample firms.
Panel A of Table 3 reports the results from such difference-in-differences regressions
using six different abnormal return measures, estimated over different event windows that
range from one to five days in length. The results in Column 1 show, that the abnormal
return on the first trading day after the announcement (i.e., on October 1, 2018) is 0.47%
lower for California-headquartered firms than for the matched control firms. The coefficient
on the dummy variable whether the firm is headquartered in California is significant at
the 1% level (t-statistic of -4.00). The results in Column 2 indicate that also on the
second trading day after the announcement (October 2), California-headquartered firms
significantly underperform the sample of matched control firms by -0.35%. When we
compute cumulative abnormal returns as the sum of the daily returns over the two days
following the announcement of the introduction of the gender quota, in Column 3, we find
0.75% lower returns for California-headquartered firms compared to the sample of matched
control firms. The obtained estimate is not only economically relevant but also statistically
significant with a t-statistic of -3.49. These results remain statistically significant and
economically meaningful when we extend the event window to a symmetric three-day event
window (Column 4), an asymmetric three-day event window (Column 5), or a symmetric
five-day event window (Column 6). With -1.19%, the latter is comparable to Ahern and
Dittmar (2012), who report a five-day abnormal stock returns of -3.54% for Norwegian
firms with no female directors around the quota adoption, compared to -0.02% for firms
with at least one female director. In California, the five-day announcement effect appears
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to be economically smaller than the effect in Norway. This may have to do with the fact
that penalties in Norway are higher (i.e., the firm would be liquidated if it violates the
quota requirement) and that there is still uncertainty in California whether the bill is
unconstitutional.
The identifying assumption central to a causal interpretation of our difference-in-differ-
ences results in Table 3 is that treated and control firms share parallel trends before the
onset of treatment, i.e., the introduction of the quota on September 30. Panel A of Figure 2
shows mean daily abnormal returns around the event date for the California-headquartered
firms and for size- and industry-matched non-California-headquartered control firms. Panel
B shows differences in mean daily abnormal returns between the two groups. In Panel A,
the three pre-treatment observations (September 26 to September 28) confirm that the
parallel trends assumption is fulfilled as the trends in pre-treatment abnormal returns
are indistinguishable between the two groups of firms. On the event day, i.e., the first
trading day after the announcement of the introduction of the quota (October 1), and the
subsequent day (October 2), however, the abnormal returns of California-headquartered
firms are significantly more negative by -0.47% and -0.35%, respectively (t-statistics of
-2.37 and -1.90).12 On October 3, the difference in mean abnormal returns shrinks to
an insignificant -0.14%. Panel B of Figure 2 confirms these patterns and again provides
supportive evidence for the parallel trends assumption: There is clearly no difference in
the pre-treatment trends across the two groups of firms.
In Panel B of Table 3, we test for the robustness of these results with respect to the
model used to predict daily expected returns. Instead of applying a regression-based market
12 Results from tests for differences in means and tests whether means are significantly different from
zero are reported in Table OA.2 in the Online Appendix. The mean abnormal returns of both the group
of California-headquartered firms and the group of matched control firms are significantly negative on the
first two trading days after the introduction of the quota (-2.48% and -1.73%; t-statistics of -11.63 and
-10.11, respectively), suggesting that there may be spillover effects to non-California-headquartered firms
or an anticipation of other states introducing quotas as well. We analyze potential spillover effects and
channels through which they operate in Section 6 of the paper.
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model to predict expected returns in the event window as in Panel A, we rely on a market-
adjusted model. That is, we subtract the daily market return from the observed daily stock
returns to obtain daily abnormal returns. The market-adjusted model mitigates concerns
of misestimated betas and simply assumes that each firm has a beta of one. The results
remain qualitatively unchanged, but the economic magnitude of the coefficient estimates
is, if anything, slightly reduced. For instance, the average two-day cumulative abnormal
return difference between firms headquartered in California and the control firms is now
-0.74% (Column 3) versus -0.75% in Column 3 of Panel A, but still significant at the 1%
level (t-statistic of -3.70).
In Panels C and D, we vary the control group. In Panel C, we use propensity score
matching to identify matched control firms. Specifically, we use profitability (ROA), lever-
age, firm size, asset structure (PPE / AT), R&D intensity (R&D / AT), and 2-digit SIC
code industry dummies to estimate propensity scores. We then choose the three closest
propensity score matched control firms. As with the size- and industry-matching applied in
our baseline setting, a non-California-headquartered firm may serve as a matched control
firm to more than one California-headquartered firm, but every control firm is included
only once in our control sample. In Panel D, we use all non-California-headquartered firms
that pass our sample selection procedure explained in Section 3.1 as control group. The
results obtained in both panels are very similar to those reported in Panel A.
Panel E reports results from a set of additional robustness tests. For the sake of brevity,
we only report results from tests using the two-day CAR (CAR(0,1)) as dependent vari-
able. In Columns 1 and 2, we only select the single closest matched control firms in the
size- and industry-matching procedure of Panel A and the propensity score matching ap-
proach used in Panel C, respectively. The coefficients on the dummy variable whether the
firm is headquartered in California are again similar to previous estimates, and, despite
substantial reductions in sample size by about one third to 810 and 792 firms, respectively,
17
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3303798 
remain significant at the 10% level or higher. The remaining four tests should mitigate
concerns that a small number of observations in our sample may drive the results docu-
mented so far. The control sample is obtained using the same size- and industry-matching
procedure as in Panels A and B. In Column 3, we test whether penny stocks drive our
results and exclude all stocks in our sample with day-end closing prices below USD 1 on
the event date from the sample (e.g., Amihud and Stoyanov, 2017). In Columns 4 and 5,
we winsorize the cumulative abnormal returns at the 0.5th and 99.5th and 5th and 95th
percentiles, respectively, instead of the 1st and 99th percentiles. Finally, in Column 6,
we estimate median regressions without winsorization of the dependent variable instead
of OLS regressions with winsorization to mitigate the effect of outliers. In all these tests
reported in Panel E, we find the results to remain qualitatively similar.
Taken together, the results in Table 3 show that the adoption of the California manda-
tory gender quota law is associated with negative and significant announcement returns,
suggesting that the introduction of the quota imposes significant costs on California-
headquartered firms and their shareholders. Economically, the estimates vary but indi-
cate that California-headquartered firms underperform non-California-headquartered con-
trol firms by between -0.53% and -1.01% over a two-day period that includes the two
trading days after the announcement. As one would expect, the bulk of the abnormal
market reaction occurred on the first trading day after the announcement. The result that
California-headquartered firms lost substantial value following the quota’s introduction
is remarkably robust and remains if we use alternative event window lengths, construct
different control groups, or take various measures to mitigate the impact of outliers.
4.2 Controlling for firm and industry characteristics
In Columns 1 to 5 of Table 4, we test whether our estimate for the loss in shareholder
value around the law’s announcement is robust to controlling for a set of firm-level covari-
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ates as well as industry-level effects. If treatment assignment is exogenous, and thus if our
difference-in-differences analysis is valid, the inclusion of covariates should not materially
affect our results obtained in Table 3 and discussed above. In Column 1 of Table 4, we
therefore add a set of firm specific control variables to our baseline specification reported
in Panel A of Table 3, Column 3. These variables capture a firm’s return on assets, its
leverage, its size, the fraction of total assets invested in property, plant and equipment, and
the fraction of total assets invested in R&D expenditures. In Column 2, we additionally
add two-digit SIC code industry dummies. These industry fixed effects absorb unobserv-
able industry characteristics, such as industry shocks occurring simultaneously with the
announcement of the quota adoption. In Columns 3 to 5, we vary the industry defini-
tion underlying the industry dummies: one-digit SIC industries (Column 3), three-digit
SIC industries (Column 4), and Fama-French 48 industries (Column 5). Across all these
specifications, the coefficient on the dummy indicating whether a firm is headquartered in
California remains economically similar to Table 3 and statistically significant at the 10%
level or higher.
4.3 Alternative event dates
Our event study results so far focus on the date on which the Governor of California
signed the quota law. The quota was introduced on January 3, 2018, passed the California
State Senate on May 31, the California State Assembly on August 29, 2018, and the Senate
passed the amended version on August 30. Media coverage on the quota was heavily
concentrated on the days following the signature of the law by the Governor, suggesting
that the quota’s adoption announcement represents the most influential event. This is
also consistent with press reports at the time which highlighted the governor’s uncertain
support of the law. However, as Eckbo, Nygaard and Thorburn (2018) point out, it is
important to include all major quota-related news events that increase the likelihood of a
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quota law in an analysis of changes in firm value. Therefore, we test whether significant
market reactions are also observable at the time of the introduction of the quota law on
January 3 or the successful votes on the legislation on May 31, August 29, and August
30. Hence, we conduct a similar difference-in-differences analysis as described in Section
4.1 but use January 1, May 31, and August 29 and August 30 as event dates, respectively.
Specifically, in Columns 6 and 7 of Table 4, we estimate cumulative abnormal returns over
a two-day event window that includes the introductory date (January 3) and the day after
(January 4). In Columns 8 and 9, we estimate cumulative abnormal returns over a two-day
event window that includes the vote date (May 31) and the day after (June 1). Finally,
in Columns 10 and 11, we use a three-day event window that includes the days of the
Assembly and the second Senate votes, which took place on consecutive days (August 29
and 30), and the day after. All four coefficients are positive and statistically insignificant
at conventional levels, suggesting that the market reaction to the California gender quota
was confined to the days after the Governor signed the law.
4.4 Standard difference-in-differences estimates
In this section, we conduct a standard difference-in-differences analysis using a treat-
ment dummy and a post-treatment dummy. To this end, we estimate OLS regressions
of daily abnormal returns (ARs) on a dummy variable which is equal to one if a firm is
headquartered in California (CA HQ (d)) and zero otherwise, and a dummy variable which
is equal to one for observations measured after the implementation of the quota (Post (d))
and zero for observations measured before the implementation of the quota. We also add an
interaction term between these two variables. Standard errors are clustered by firm-level.
The results are reported in Table 5. Column 1 reports results obtained when using a four-
day event window with two pre-treatment and two post-treatment observations per sample
firm. Consistent with results reported in Tables 3 and 4, the difference-in-differences es-
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timator, i.e., the coefficient on CA HQ (d) × Post (d), is negative and significant at the
5% level. In terms of economic magnitude, the coefficient suggests a two-day abnormal
return of California-headquartered firms that is 0.78% lower than that of non-California-
headquartered firms (0.39% per post-treatment day), a number reasonably close to the
two-day abnormal return difference of between -0.53% and -1.01% reported in Table 3.
The results in Columns 2 and 3 show that the inclusion of industry dummies and a set of
firm-level control variables and industry dummies, respectively, leaves the results virtually
unchanged. In Column 4, we add firm fixed effects to the specification in Column 1 to
control for unobservable heterogeneity at the firm-level that is time-invariant. Note that
the firm fixed effects absorb all firm-level covariates, including the treatment dummy, CA
HQ (d), as these variables are time-invariant over the sample period used in this analy-
sis. While the t-statistic is slightly reduced, the difference-in-differences estimate remains
economically unchanged, still suggesting a two-day abnormal return difference of 0.78%.13
4.5 Calendar-time portfolio analysis
In this section, we conduct robustness tests that address concerns arising from the fact
that we study the market reaction of firms to one single event date. More specifically, all
firms in the treatment group, i.e., the firms headquartered in California in our sample, are
treated at the same date, October 1, 2018. Such a single event date may result in contem-
poraneous cross-correlation of (abnormal) stock returns. To address this concern, we follow
Eckbo, Nygaard, and Thorburn (2018) and form equally-weighted calendar time portfolios
of all California-headquartered firms, our treatment sample, and all non-California head-
quartered size- and industry-matched control firms, our control sample. We then estimate
the portfolios’ daily abnormal returns by estimating the following time-series regression
13 In unreported results, we extend the event window to a six-day period around the announcement
of the quota. The difference-in-differences estimator remains statistically significant at the 10% level and
economically comparable to our main results.
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over a sample that includes all observations from the 250-day estimation window, which
ends on September 21, and the observations from the respective event window:
rt = α + ARdt + βrwt + t (1)
where rt is the daily equally-weighted return of the portfolio of all California-headquartered
(or size- and industry matched control) firms in excess of the daily 1-month US treasury
bill rate. Alternatively, to analyze differences in abnormal returns between California-
headquartered and non-California-headquartered firms, we define rt as the daily difference
in portfolio returns of California-headquartered and non-California-headquartered firms.
rwt is the daily value-weighted market index return in excess of the daily 1-month US
treasury bill rate. As a proxy for the market return, we use the return of a self-computed,
value-weighted market index consisting of all sample firms. dt is a dummy variable that
takes a value of one for each day in the event window and zero otherwise. AR is the
average daily abnormal portfolio return over the event days. Hence, estimates for the
cumulative abnormal returns are obtained by multiplying the obtained coefficient for AR
by the number of days in the event window. For instance, to obtain the two-day CAR(0,1),
dt takes a value of one in the two-day event window that includes the first two trading days
after the quota came into effect. The two-day cumulative abnormal return, CAR(0,1), is
then computed as 2 × AR.
The results are reported in Table 6. As in Table 3, we use six alternative abnormal
return measures, estimated over event windows that range from one to five days in length.
Consistent with results reported in previous tables and in Figure 2, we find announcement
returns to the introduction of the quota to be significantly more negative for California-
headquartered firms, as shown in the last two columns of the table. In terms of economic
magnitude, the results obtained here are similar to those reported in Table 3. For instance,
22
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3303798 
the two-day cumulative abnormal return, which includes the event day and the day after
(CAR(0,1)), is -0.75% in Panel A of Table 3 and -0.76% in Table 6. Hence, account-
ing for potential contemporaneous cross-correlation resulting from a single event does not
materially affect our results.
5 Cross-sectional tests
In this section, we analyze whether all California-headquartered firms are equally af-
fected by the passage of the law or whether there are important cross-sectional differences.
For instance, if the quota’s introduction is expected to result in supply side frictions on
the (female) director labor market, we would expect California-headquartered firms to be
more (negatively) affected the fewer female directors they have on the board at the time
of the introduction of the quota and the more directors are required to comply with the
quota’s requirements. Similarly, we would expect larger firms to be less (negatively) af-
fected by the quota as larger firms are generally more attractive employers to directors as
both compensation and reputation are strongly positively correlated with firm size.
Following Ahern and Dittmar (2012), we analyze such cross-sectional patterns using
pooled OLS regressions of two-day cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) on a dummy
variable that is equal to one if a firm is headquartered in California (CA HQ (d)), a firm-
specific characteristic, e.g., related to quota compliance or female board representation, and
an interaction term between the dummy whether the firm is headquartered in California
and the firm characteristic. In other words, we use the regression framework from Column 3
in Panel A of Table 3, and saturate it with a firm-characteristic and an interaction term be-
tween a firm-characteristic and the California-headquarter indicator. Results are reported
in Tables 7 and 8. In the first column of Table 7, we interact the California-headquarter
dummy with a variable equal to one if a firm is, as of September 30, not complying with
the quota, and zero otherwise. The results imply that California-headquartered firms not
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in compliance with the quota underperform California-headquartered firms in compliance
with the quota by -1.03% (significant at the 1% level). The coefficient on the stand-alone
variable indicating whether a firm complies with the quota is insignificant. The stand-alone
coefficient on the California-headquarter indicator is positive and significant at the 10%
level, suggesting that California-headquartered firms, that elected female directors early
and were in compliance before the introduction of the quota, may even benefit from the
introduction of the quota. Next, we analyze whether the market reaction at California-
headquartered firms not only depends on whether firms fail to comply with the quota but
whether it also depends on the extent to which the quota is not fulfilled. To this end, in
Column 2, we use a variable that counts the number of female directors necessary to fulfill
the quota (# female directors missing), and, in Column 3, we use this variable scaled by
board size (Shortfall (%)). Both variables, when interacted with the California headquar-
ter indicator, load significantly negative, suggesting that the market reaction indeed varies
with the female director gap on the board of California-headquartered firms. Moreover, the
coefficient on the stand-alone California-headquarter indicator variable is indistinguishable
from zero once we control for the need of California-headquartered firms to appoint female
directors, supporting the notion that stock return differences between firms headquartered
in California and their matched peers around the introduction of the quota are not driven
by other factors than the female director gap. Rather, these results imply that frictions
associated with appointing female directors increase with the number of female directors
needed to fulfill the quota.
In Column 4 of Table 7, we test whether the stock market response depends on the per-
centage of female directors on the board. The results show that California-headquartered
firms show a more negative announcement return to the introduction of the quota in general
– the standalone coefficient on CA HQ (d) is negative and significant at the 1% level – but
that the announcement return becomes more positive the larger the percentage of female
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directors on the board. Indeed, the interaction term between the California-headquarter
indicator and the percentage of female directors on the board is positive and significant.
This finding is consistent with the results in Columns 1 to 3.
Besides using this setting to explain variation in the abnormal stock returns around
the quota adoption announcement with board structure variables, we are also interested
in shedding light on the question which firms face larger difficulties in appointing female
directors. In Columns 1 and 2 of Table 8, we study the role of firm size by interacting
the California-headquarter indicator with proxies for firm size. As directorships at larger
firms are associated with both higher compensation and higher reputational gains, we
would expect larger firms to face fewer difficulties in attracting skilled female directors.
Moreover, larger firms hire directors internationally, which likely gives access to a larger
pool of female director candidates. In Column 1, we interact the California-headquarter
dummy with the logarithm of total assets as a continuous measure of firm size, and, in
Column 2, with a dummy variable that is equal to one for firms in the highest size quintile.
The results in both columns suggest that firm size indeed mutes the negative quota effect,
which means that in particular small firms with headquarters in California are responsible
for the negative abnormal stock price reaction at California-headquartered firms observed
around the adoption of the quota announcement. In particular, the results in Column 2
suggest that the negative stock return effect to California-headquartered firms is confined to
firms in the smaller four size quintiles, but not to firms in the largest size quintile. Indeed,
the coefficient on the interaction term is positive and slightly larger than the coefficient on
the dummy variable whether the firm is incorporated in California (the combined effect of
0.19 is insignificant with a t-statistic of 0.5). Consistent with the results in Columns 1 and
2 of Table 8, Panel B of Figure 1 shows that larger firms (as proxied by index membership)
25
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3303798 
have higher female board representation already before the quota’s introduction.14
Finally, in Column 3 of Table 8, we study the role that corporate governance plays
for the abnormal stock returns following the quota law announcement. To this end, we
match corporate governance data from Factset’s SharkRepellent database, which enables
us to construct, for each sample firm as of the quota adoption date, a corporate gover-
nance index in the spirit of Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell’s (2009) E-Index. Specifically,
we construct a score variable to which we add one point for each of the following pro-
visions: a poison pill, a staggered board, a supermajority vote requirement for mergers,
a supermajority vote requirement to amend the charter, or a supermajority vote require-
ment to amend the bylaws.15 The results show that the coefficient on the interaction
term between the California-headquarter indicator and the (modified) E-Index is negative
and significant, implying that California-headquartered firms with poor governance (i.e.,
more anti-takeover protection devices in place) suffer lower returns around the adoption
announcement. These results suggest that firms’ corporate governance structures influence
firms’ ability (or willingness) to attract qualified female directors.
6 Spillover effects
In this section, we analyze potential spillover effects of the gender quota’s introduction
to firms headquartered in other states than California. First, we analyze whether non-
California-headquartered firms experience a negative and significant stock market reaction
to the introduction of the quota as well. Second, we test for the channels through which
these spillover effects materialize.
14 One concern with these results is that larger firms have higher female board representation at the
onset of treatment (i.e., the announcement of the quota’s introduction). However, we continue to find a
statistically significant size effect once we control for female board representation.
15 We do not use ISS data, which is the basis of the E-Index, since it is not available for our sample
period yet. Unfortunately, SharkRepellent does not provide information on the sixth provision of the E-
Index, that is, whether the CEO’s contract contains a severance agreement provision known as a “golden
parachute”. Hence, our modified E-Index only includes five attributes and ranges from zero to five.
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Results reported in Panel A of Figure 2 and Table 6 indeed show negative and sig-
nificant stock market reactions to the introduction of the quota not only to California-
headquartered, but also to non-California-headquartered firms. In Table OA.2, we con-
duct our baseline event study analysis, underlying the analysis in Panel A of Table 3, for
the subsamples of California-headquartered and industry- and size matched control firms
separately. The results show a significantly negative stock market reaction of -1.73% (t-
statistic of -10.11) for non-California headquartered control firms over the first two trading
days after the introduction of the quota in California. In summary, standard event study
analysis (Table OA.2) and a calendar time portfolio analysis (Table 6) are suggestive of
spillover effects of the quota law to non-California-headquartered firms and indicate that
these firms, even though not directly affected by the law, still show a significantly negative
market reaction to the announcement of the quota.16
There are mostly two channels through which such spillover effects are expected to
operate. First, California-headquartered firms may attempt to attract female directors
from the boards of non-California-headquartered companies to be able to comply with
the quota. Hence, competition among firms for skilled female directors may become more
intense, and some firms may even be expected to lose valuable female directors. Second,
if the introduction of a mandatory gender quota in California raises concerns that other
states follow by also introducing gender quotas, we would expect firms headquartered in
states that are more likely to pass such laws to show more negative announcement returns
to the quota. To empirically test these two channels, we retain only the matched non-
California-headquartered firms in our sample and estimate regressions similar to those
16 The existence of such spillover effects violates the stable unit treatment value assumption (SUTVA)
underlying any difference-in-differences approach. Specifically, this assumption postulates that the outcome
of some unit of observation should be unaffected by the assignment of treatment to other units. Given
that the control firms also experience negative stock returns, these spillover effects most likely lead to an
underestimation of the firm value effect of the quota law, that is, the return differences between California-
headquartered firms and the sample of control firms.
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reported in Tables 7 and 8. Specifically, we regress the cumulative abnormal return over
the two trading days after the announcement of the quota on a firm-specific characteristic,
e.g., female board representation.
To empirically test the first channel, we need a measure that quantifies the extent
to which an increase in the demand for female directors at California-headquartered firms
hampers the ability of non-California-headquartered firms to retain or appoint female direc-
tors. We construct two measures, which both rest on the assumption that similar firms com-
pete for the same directors and that director supply is limited (e.g., Knyazeva, Knyazeva,
and Masulis, 2013). To construct the first measure, we count, for each matched control
sample firm, the total number of female directors required for all California-headquartered
firms in the same two-digit SIC code industry to comply with California’s female director
quota (# female directors missing). To address the problem that this measure is correlated
with the number of firms in an industry, we scale it by the total number of female directors
required by all firms in a two-digit SIC code industry to comply with the Californian quota,
i.e., assuming that all firms – whether headquartered in California or elsewhere – have to
comply to such a quota to obtain our second measure. In Column 1 of Table 9, where we
use the first of the two measures, we obtain a negative coefficient that is significant at the
10% level. In Column 2, we use the scaled variable and find the coefficient to be negative
and significant at the 1% level. These results confirm that non-California-headquartered
firms in industries that likely face stronger competition for female talent in the boardroom
experience more negative announcement returns in response to the introduction of the
quota.
Results in Tables 7 and 8 show that the market reaction to the quota’s announcement
was less negative for California-headquartered firms the higher the fraction of female out-
side directors on the board and the larger the firm. In Column 3 of Table 9, we test whether
we find similar patterns in the spillover effects to non-California-headquartered firms. To
28
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3303798 
this end, we interact a dummy variable indicating whether a firm is in the highest total as-
sets quintile with the fraction of female directors on the board while controlling for the two
stand-alone variables. The results show that a larger female board representation is associ-
ated with more negative spillover effects. However, the coefficient on the interaction term
is positive, significant, and larger in magnitude than the coefficient on the female board
representation variable, suggesting that the negative spillover effect is not only muted for
large firms but even reversed. Hence, smaller firms not headquartered in California may
be at risk of losing valuable female directors to (larger) California-headquartered firms. In
Column 4, we follow the idea that certain directors at non-California-headquartered firms
may receive offers to join the boards of California-headquartered firms. As a proxy for the
propensity to leave a given firm, we compute the natural logarithm of the average tenure of
the female directors on the board. Naturally, this measure can only be computed for firms
with at least one female director on the board, so the number of observations is reduced.
Still, we find that the tenure of the female directors on the board is positively correlated
with the returns of non-California-headquartered firms, consistent with the notion that
firms experience a more negative stock price reaction the more likely it is to lose a female
director.
In Columns 5 to 7 of Table 9, we explore the second channel: The negative spillover ef-
fect might also be driven by the propensity of a given non-California-headquartered firm to
become subject to similar gender quota regulation in the future. Given the opposing views
of the Democratic and Republican parties on the controversial issue of gender legislation
for corporate boards, we use the local political orientation as a proxy for the propensity
to become subject to a similar quota. To this end, we collect the state-level results of the
2016 Presidential Election for the Republican and Democratic Party and assign firms to
states based on the location of their headquarters. In Column 5 (6), we find that firms
with headquarters outside California but in states with a higher share of votes obtained
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by the Democratic (Republican) party experience more negative (positive) announcement
returns around the adoption of the gender quota in California. Similarly, in Column 7, we
use an indicator variable labeled Trump (d) which is equal to one if a firm is headquartered
in a state where the majority of the votes were obtained by the Republican Party. Consis-
tent with the results shown in the previous two columns, the coefficient on this variable is
positive and significant.
In summary, our results show that the introduction of the gender legislation in Califor-
nia was associated with negative announcement returns not only at California-headquart-
ered, but also at non-California-headquartered firms. These findings are consistent with
spillover effects of the California gender quota to non-California headquartered firms. More-
over, we find evidence in support of two channels through which these spillover effects may
operate: First, firms that are more likely to face difficulties in appointing or retaining female
directors have more negative returns, and, second, firms that are more likely to become
subject to a future gender quota law also show more negative announcement returns.
7 The impact of the quota on board structure
7.1 The impact of the quota on female board representation
Gender quotas introduced in other countries have been shown to be an effective way to
force firms to increase female board representation. In Norway, for instance, the share of
female board representation has increased from around 10% in 2003, the year the Norwegian
Parliament passed the quota law, to about 40% in 2008, the year the quota had to be
fulfilled (Ahern and Dittmar, 2012). In the case of California’s quota, however, it is a
priori unclear whether firms will respond by restructuring their boards for at least three
reasons. First, the new legislation prioritizes one gender over the other, thereby potentially
conflicting with the US Constitution, the California Constitution, and Civil Rights Law.
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Second, it may violate the internal affairs doctrine, which postulates that matters involving
the board of directors are subject to the laws of the state of incorporation and not where the
headquarters are located (Grundfest, 2018). Not surprisingly, at least 30 business groups
already indicated their willingness to challenge the law (California Chamber of Commerce,
2018). Third, while the penalty for non-compliance in Norway is a forced liquidation of the
company, non-compliance with the Californian quota is penalized with a fine that seems
rather small at least from the perspective of the larger firms in the sample.
Even though the adoption of the quota in California took place only recently, we conduct
a preliminary analysis with the goal of testing whether California-headquartered firms
respond to the quota law, that is, whether they already started to increase the share of
female directors on the board relative to a sample of matched control firms headquartered
outside California. Figure 3 shows the change in mean female board representation relative
to the introduction of the quota on September 30, 2018, in percentage points on a daily
basis from August 1 to November 30 using board data from BoardEx. The solid lines show
these changes for the treatment sample (in black) and the industry- and size matched
control sample (in grey). Consistent with the notion that California’s quota effectively
and timely affects female board representation, California-headquartered firms appear to
start responding to the quota by increasing female board representation relative to the
sample of control firms already two weeks after the adoption of the quota law. Moreover,
California-headquartered firms in need of at least two female directors to comply with the
quota’s requirement (black dashed line) seem to respond stronger when compared to the
other firms headquartered in California and the non-California-headquartered control firms
that need at least two female directors to fulfill the quota (grey dashed line).
To analyze this pattern in a regression framework, we estimate, for each firm, the
fraction of female directors on the board at the end of September, October, and November
2018, which results in a firm-month panel containing up to three monthly observations per
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firm. We then regress the fraction of female directors on the board on dummy variables
for the month of observation, omitting September, and interaction terms between the
California headquarter dummy and the month dummy variables. To account for time-
invariant unobserved heterogeneity at the firm level, we add firm fixed effects. To account
for within-correlation of different observations on one specific firms, the standard errors are
clustered at the firm level. The coefficients on the month dummies indicate the percentage
points by which female board representation has changed, on average, across all sample
firms compared to the introduction of the quota at the end of September 2018. The
coefficients on the interaction terms are the difference-in-differences estimators, that is,
the average difference in the change of female board representation of Californian firms
relative to the control firms in a given month. If the quota law already had a statistically
significant impact on female board representation at firms headquartered in California, the
difference-in-differences estimators would show a positive and significant coefficient.
The results in Column 1 of Table 10 show that female board representation at California-
headquartered firms indeed increased relative to the sample of non-California-headquartered
control firms. Specifically, one month after the quota’s introduction, the difference amounts
to 0.19 percentage points but is insignificant at conventional levels. Two months after the
quota’s introduction, the difference increases to 0.36 percentage points, which is statisti-
cally significant at the 10% level. Next, we test whether firms under more pressure to
appoint female directors respond stronger to the introduction of the quota. In Column
2, we, therefore, retain only firms in the sample that need at least one female director to
comply with the quota at announcement, and, in Column 3, we retain only firms that need
at least two female directors. Consistent with our expectations, we find that the interac-
tion terms between the California-headquarter dummy and the month dummy variables
increase monotonically from Column 1 to Column 3. Specifically, California-headquartered
firms that require one (two) female directors to comply with the quota on average increased
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female board representation by 0.50 (0.55) percentage points relative to the control firms.
Finally, the results in Table 10 show that both the October-end and November-end dummy
variables are positive and significant, suggesting that both California headquartered and
non-California-headquartered firms significantly increased female board representation in
the first two months after the introduction of the quota – but at the difference-in-differences
estimates show, California-headquartered firms even more than others.
In summary, these results imply that California’s female board quota, although argued
to be lacking teeth, is taken seriously by companies, which seem to respond by significantly
increasing the share of female directors on the board already within two months after
adoption of the quota.
7.2 The impact of the quota on director skills
In this subsection, we test whether the introduction of the quota is associated with
shifts of board skills at California-headquartered firms. Such a shift would be expected
if California-headquartered firms appointed male directors with a certain skill set before
the introduction of the quota, and are now forced to dismiss some of these directors when
recruiting female replacements from a pool of candidates with different characteristics. To
test this empirically, we follow Ahern and Dittmar (2012) and compare the characteristics
of newly appointed, leaving, and incumbent directors for the time period between the
introduction of the quota (September 30, 2018) and the last month-end for which board
data is available from BoardEx (November 30, 2018). Table 11 shows that California-
headquartered firms appointed 74 directors (32 or 43% females), dismissed 68 directors (5
or 7% females), and kept 7,084 directors (1,167 or 16% females) in this time period. For
each director, we compute a range of measures that proxy for her characteristics and show
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results for a selected subset.17
In the following tests, we focus on California-headquartered firms and compare the
characteristics of newly appointed female directors with the characteristics of incumbent
female and male directors (Panel A of Table 11) as well as appointed male and leaving
female directors (Panel B of Table 11). Not surprisingly, results show that newly appointed
female directors are significantly younger than incumbent female and male directors as well
as leaving male directors. More telling is a comparison of newly appointed female directors
and newly appointed male directors, which also indicates that newly appointed female
directors are around 2.5 years younger, but the difference is not significant at conventional
levels (t-statistic of -1.39). We also study more sophisticated measures of experience than
director age. Results show that newly appointed female directors are significantly less
likely to possess work experience at another firm in the same two-digit SIC code industry
(industry experience), experience as a director of another listed firm, and experience as an
outside director of another listed firm than incumbent female and male directors (Panel A).
Although results for comparisons between newly appointed and leaving female directors
are similar in economic terms, they lack statistical power due to the small sample sizes. We
also test whether newly appointed female directors differ from the other director types in
terms of their current occupation. These tests provide some evidence that newly appointed
female outside directors are more likely to be employed in lower-level executive positions
at other firms, for instance, as a Vice President, and are less likely to be employed as top
executives at other firms, for example, as an inside director or a CEO, but differences are
not statistically significant for all comparisons. Finally, we find some evidence that newly
appointed female directors are less likely to qualify as independent outside director when
17 For newly appointed directors, we compute time-varying measures as of the date she joins the board
of a given firm. For leaving directors, we compute time-varying measures as of the date she leaves the
board of a given firm. For incumbent directors, we compute time-varying measures as of the last calendar
day of a given month.
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compared to incumbent female and male directors.
Even though these results are based on a small sample of board changes and should be
considered preliminary, it is still important to emphasize that several of the characteris-
tics underrepresented among female directors appointed to California-headquartered firms
following the introduction of the quota have shown to be significantly related to firm per-
formance. For instance, Drobetz, Oesch, Schmid, and von Meyerinck (2018) and Hoitash,
Hoitash, and Faleye (2018) show that director industry experience is positively related to
firm value. Fich (2005) and Fahlenbrach, Low, and Stulz (2010) find that directors simul-
taneously serving as CEOs in other firms are associated with higher firm values. Knyazeva,
Knyazeva, and Masulis (2013) document similar findings for independent outside directors.
In summary, these preliminary results are in line with both results reported in Ahern
and Dittmar (2012) for the Norwegian quota and anecdotal evidence on female director
characteristics in the US.18 Moreover, these results are consistent with the notion that
reductions in value at firms headquartered in California around the adoption of the quota
are at least in part driven by shifts in investors’ expectations regarding future board quality,
likely caused by a limited supply of skilled female candidates that prevent firms from
appointing directors that maximize firm value.
8 Conclusion
Even though the percentage of female university graduates increases each year and
women successfully establish themselves in many academic profiles, such as law and medicine,
women are still heavily underrepresented in corporate leadership positions. Many countries
18 Tricia Griffith, one of the few female CEOs in an S&P500 firm, commented on potential lim-
ited supply concerns caused by California’s gender quota in the Fortune magazine on October 3: “We
need to look deeper in organizations [for female candidates]. If you want someone that has a CEO
role to their name, you’re going to be very limited. So you need to go a layer deeper, then another
layer. And those women and people are hard at work in operating roles that have a lot of value.” See
http://fortune.com/2018/10/03/women-boards-california/.
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around the work recently introduced or currently discuss a board gender quota to achieve
an increase in female representation on corporate boards. On September 30, 2018, Cali-
fornia became the first US state to introduce a mandatory board gender quota applicable
to all publicly-traded firms headquartered in the state. In this paper, we analyze the value
consequence of this quota, potential spillover effects to firms headquartered in other states,
and consequences for the director labor market.
We find that the introduction of the gender quota law is associated with significantly
negative announcement returns to California-headquartered firms. This result withstands
a battery of robustness tests, including the use of different event windows, alternative
models to estimate the expected return, different control groups, and the use of portfolios
sorts analysis to mitigate cross-sectional correlation issues resulting from the study of a
single event date. Consistent with the quota imposing frictions, we find the negative
announcement effect to be larger for firms requiring more female directors to comply with
the quota. There is also evidence of spillover effects to non-California-headquartered firms.
We find evidence in support of two channels through which these spillover effects op-
erate: First, we find spillover effects to be larger for firms operating in industries in
which California-headquartered firms lack more female directors to comply with the quota,
suggesting that non-California-headquartered firms may lose valuable female directors to
California-headquartered firms. Second, we document negative spillover effects for firms
headquartered in states dominated by the Democratic Party, consistent with the idea that
these firms are more likely to become subject to a board gender quota as well. Finally,
we show that, already as of month-end November, California-headquartered firms respond
to the quota by increasing female board representation relative to a set of control firms.
Newly appointed female directors differ significantly in terms of age, independence, and ex-
perience from newly appointed male directors, but also from incumbent and leaving female
and male directors.
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Figure 1: Female board representation in listed US firms
This figure shows female board representation in all listed US firms covered by the ISS (formerly RiskMet-
rics) Director database from calendar years 1997 to 2017. Panel A shows female board representation for
different director types expressed as a fraction of board size. Inside directors are those directors classified
as executives by ISS, CEOs are inside directors with current occupation description being “CEO”, and
outside directors are all directors that are not inside directors. Panel B shows female board representation
by index membership. Board data is measured as of a firm-year’s annual meeting date. Observations are
assigned to the calendar year in which an annual meeting takes place. Index membership is determined as
of the annual meeting date using index constituent data provided by Compustat.
Panel A: Female board representation by director type
Panel B: Female board representation by index membership
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Figure 2: Abnormal returns around the event date (September 26 to October
3, 2018)
Panel A of the figure shows mean daily abnormal returns of 456 California-headquartered and 777 industry-
and size-matched non-California-headquartered control firms. Panel B displays differences in daily abnor-
mal returns between the sample of California-headquartered firms and the control sample of non-California-
headquartered firms. Sunday, September 30, is the quota’s adoption announcement date and October 1
the first trading day after the announcement, i.e., the event date. Daily abnormal returns are computed as
the observed return minus the predicted return from a market model regression estimated over a 250-day
estimation window that ends on Friday, September 21. As a proxy for the market return, we use the return
of a self-computed, value-weighted market index consisting of all sample firms. The sample comprises all
firms in Compustat with a data entry within one calendar year before September-end 2018, excluding util-
ity and financial firms (SIC codes 4940-4949 and 6000-6999, respectively), firms with missing information
on the state in which it is headquartered, firms headquartered outside the US, firms with negative book
value of equity, firms with missing financial control variables, firms that only list American Depository
Receipts, and firms without a listing on NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ. We also require at least 125 daily
return observations during the 250-day estimation window and complete return data for the entire five-day
event window around the event date (October 1). For each firm headquartered in California, we draw the
three closest size-matched non-California-headquartered firms in the same two-digit SIC code industry as
control firms. While the same firm may serve as a matched control firm to more than one California-
headquartered firm, every control firm is included only once in our sample. All abnormal return measures
are winsorized at their 1st and 99th percentile.
Panel A: Daily abnormal returns of California- and non-California-headquartered control firms
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Panel B: Differences abnormal returns between California- and non-California-headquartered control firms
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Figure 3: Changes of female board representation around quota adoption
This figure shows daily changes in female board representation for different firm samples relative to the
introduction of the quota on September 30, 2018, over the time period August 1 to November 30, 2018.
Solid lines show percentage point changes for a sample of California-headquartered firms (in black) and
a sample of industry- and size-matched non-California-headquartered control firms (in grey). Dashed
lines show changes in percentage points for subsamples of California-headquartered (in black) and non-
California-headquartered firms (in grey) firms that miss more than one female director to fulfill California’s
board quota at the quota’s introduction date. The sample comprises all firms in Compustat with a data
entry within one calendar year before September-end 2018, excluding utility and financial firms (SIC
codes 4940-4949 and 6000-6999, respectively), firms with missing information on the state in which it is
headquartered, firms headquartered outside the US, firms with negative book value of equity, firms with
missing financial control variables, firms that only list American Depository Receipts, and firms without a
listing on NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ. We also require at least 125 daily return observations during the
250-day estimation window that ends September 21 and complete return data for the entire five-day event
window around the event date (October 1). For each firm headquartered in California, we draw the three
closest size-matched non-California-headquartered firms in the same two-digit SIC code industry as control
firms. While the same firm may serve as a matched control firm to more than one California-headquartered
firm, every control firm is included only once in our sample. Board data is obtained from BoardEx. The
red vertical line indicates the date the law was signed by the Governor (September 30, 2018).
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Table 1: Overview of international gender legislation
This table shows an overview of international gender legislation. We only include laws that apply to companies (not to state-owned entities), that
are mandatory (not compulsory or on a comply-or-explain basis), and that carry some sort of pre-defined sanction (no potential sanctions). In
the column labeled Focus, BoD indicates board of directors, SM senior management, and SB supervisory board (or "Aufsichtsrat") in Germany,
which has a two-tier board system.
Country Passage date Applicable to Focus Requirement Compliance by
Norway 19.12.2003 /
09.12.2005
Listed firms BoD 1 each gender (2-3 directors), 2 (4-5),
3 (6-8), 4 (9), 40% (> 9)
2005 / 2008
Israel 11.03.2007 Listed firms BoD 1 woman 2010
Iceland 04.03.2010 Listed and private firms BoD 40% each gender; if < 3 directors, one
of each gender
2013
France 13.01.2011 Listed firms, private firms > 500
employees or > EUR 50m sales
BoD 20% each gender / 40% each gender; if
> 8 directors, difference < 2
2014 / 2017
Italy 18.06.2011 Listed firms BoD 20% each gender / 33.3% each gender 2012 / 2015
Belgium 14.09.2011 Listed firms BoD 33.3% each gender 2017 (large), 2019
(small)
Malaysia 27.06.2011 Firms > 250 employees BoD,
SM
30% women 2016
India 30.08.2013 /
28.03.2018
Listed firms BoD 1 woman / 1 independent woman 2015 / 2019 (large),
2020 (small)
Germany 06.03.2015 Listed firms subject to 50%
co-determination law
SB 30% each gender 2016
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics
This table reports descriptive statistics for the full sample of 2,462 firms (Panel A) and a sample com-
prising the 456 California-headquartered firms and 777 industry- and size-matched control firms (Panel
B). The sample consists of one cross-section of Compustat firms as of the quota’s adoption announcement
(September 30). The sample includes all firms in Compustat with a data entry within one calendar year
before September-end 2018, excluding utility and financial firms (SIC codes 4940-4949 and 6000-6999, re-
spectively), firms with missing information on the state in which it is headquartered, firms headquartered
outside the US, firms with negative book value of equity, firms with missing financial control variables,
firms that only list American Depository Receipts, and firms without a listing on NYSE, AMEX, or NAS-
DAQ. We also require at least 125 daily return observations during the 250-day estimation window that
ends September 21 and complete return data for the entire five-day event window around the event date
(October 1). Panel A shows descriptive statistics for the resulting sample. Panel B shows descriptive
statistics for a sample in which we draw, for each firm headquartered in California, the three closest
size-matched non-California-headquartered firms in the same two-digit SIC code industry as control firms.
While the same firm may serve as a matched control firm to more than one California-headquartered firm,
every control firm is included only once in our sample. All financial ratios are winsorized at the 1st and
99th percentiles. Detailed variable definitions are in the Appendix.
Panel A: Full sample
Firm characteristic Mean P25 Median P75 SD N
CA HQ (d) 0.185 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.389 2,462
ROA -0.018 -0.020 0.086 0.138 0.313 2,462
Leverage 0.221 0.010 0.201 0.365 0.196 2,462
Total assets (in millions) 6,350.630 135.410 709.912 2,941.623 28,192.785 2,462
PPE / TA 0.220 0.044 0.120 0.311 0.242 2,462
R&D / TA 0.084 0.000 0.008 0.092 0.160 2,462
Board size 8.111 7.000 8.000 9.000 2.153 2,455
Female directors (%) 0.153 0.000 0.143 0.222 0.126 2,455
2021 requ. failed (d) 0.840 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.367 2,455
# female directors missing 1.523 1.000 2.000 2.000 1.140 2,455
Shortfall (%) 0.214 0.100 0.222 0.333 0.164 2,455
Panel B: California-headquartered firms and industry- and size-matched control firms
Firm characteristic Mean P25 Median P75 SD N
CA HQ (d) 0.370 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.483 1,233
ROA -0.087 -0.179 0.056 0.126 0.373 1,233
Leverage 0.180 0.000 0.131 0.314 0.185 1,233
Total assets (in millions) 4,429.506 80.494 383.635 1,454.511 22,233.197 1,233
PPE / TA 0.140 0.029 0.080 0.183 0.171 1,233
R&D / TA 0.131 0.000 0.054 0.171 0.196 1,233
Board size 7.754 6.000 8.000 9.000 1.977 1,230
Female directors (%) 0.147 0.000 0.143 0.222 0.124 1,230
2021 requ. failed (d) 0.875 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.331 1,230
# female directors missing 1.610 1.000 2.000 2.000 1.057 1,230
Shortfall (%) 0.231 0.111 0.250 0.333 0.156 1,230
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Table 3: Market reaction to the quota announcement
This table reports differences in abnormal returns to the announcement of the gender quota in California
between California-headquartered and non-California-headquartered control firms. Each column shows
results from a pooled ordinary least squares regression of an abnormal return measure on a dummy
variable set equal to one if a firm is headquartered in California (CA HQ (d)). Panel A reports the results
from the base case model, in which we compute daily abnormal returns as the observed return minus
the predicted return from a market model regression estimated over a 250-day estimation window that
ends on Friday, September 21. As a proxy for the market return, we use the return of a self-computed,
value-weighted market index consisting of all sample firms. For each California-headquartered sample
firm, the three closest firms in terms of size that are active in the same two-digit SIC code industry are
chosen as matched control firms. While the same firm may serve as a matched control firm to more than
one California-headquartered firm in the treatment sample, every control firm is included only once in our
sample. Across columns, we vary the length of the event window. In Panel B, we use a market-adjusted
model, assuming that the beta of all stocks is equal to one. In Panels C and D, we use alternative matching
procedures. In Panel C, we use propensity score matching to draw up to three matched control firms per
California-headquartered sample firm. In Panel D, we use all non-California-headquartered firms as control
firms. Panel E includes additional robustness tests for a two-day CAR that includes the event day and
the subsequent day. In Columns 1 and 2, only the single closest industry- and size-matched firm or the
closest propensity score matched control firm is selected into the control sample, respectively. In Column
3, we drop penny stocks with stock prices below USD 1. Columns 4 and 5 report results for a more or less
restrictive winsorization of the dependent variable, respectively. Column 6 shows results from a median
regression and no winsorizing of the dependent variable. The sample comprises all firms in Compustat
with a data entry within one calendar year before September-end 2018, excluding utility and financial firms
(SIC codes 4940-4949 and 6000-6999, respectively), firms with missing information on the state in which it
is headquartered, firms headquartered outside the US, firms with negative book value of equity, firms with
missing financial control variables, firms that only list American Depository Receipts, and firms without
a listing on NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ. We also require at least 125 daily return observations during
the 250-day estimation window and complete return data for the entire five-day event window around the
event date (October 1). If not otherwise noted, abnormal return measures are winsorized at the 1st and
99th percentiles. Standard errors are clustered at the two-digit SIC code industry level. All regressions
include an intercept, which is not shown for brevity. Detailed variable definitions are in the Appendix. *,
**, and ***, indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Panel A: Baseline results
Dependent variable: AR(0) AR(1) CAR(0,1) CAR(-1,1) CAR(0,2) CAR(-2,2)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CA HQ (d) -0.47*** -0.35** -0.75*** -0.84** -1.01*** -1.19***
(-4.00) (-2.18) (-3.49) (-2.32) (-5.59) (-2.98)
R2 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01
N 1,233 1,233 1,233 1,233 1,233 1,233
Panel B: Market-adjusted model
Dependent variable: AR(0) AR(1) CAR(0,1) CAR(-1,1) CAR(0,2) CAR(-2,2)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CA HQ (d) -0.43*** -0.35** -0.74*** -0.76** -1.01*** -1.02***
(-4.18) (-2.46) (-3.70) (-2.52) (-5.10) (-3.64)
R2 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01
N 1,233 1,233 1,233 1,233 1,233 1,233
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Panel C: Three closest propensity score matched control firms
Dependent variable: AR(0) AR(1) CAR(0,1) CAR(-1,1) CAR(0,2) CAR(-2,2)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CA HQ (d) -0.40*** -0.43** -0.79*** -0.85** -0.98*** -1.29**
(-3.81) (-2.12) (-3.26) (-2.15) (-3.67) (-2.34)
R2 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
N 1,198 1,198 1,198 1,198 1,198 1,198
Panel D: All non-CA headquarted firms as control firms
Dependent variable: AR(0) AR(1) CAR(0,1) CAR(-1,1) CAR(0,2) CAR(-2,2)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CA HQ (d) -0.58*** -0.47** -1.01*** -1.12*** -1.11*** -1.26***
(-3.92) (-2.52) (-3.66) (-2.92) (-3.92) (-3.47)
R2 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
N 2,462 2,462 2,462 2,462 2,462 2,462
Panel E: Additional robustness tests
Dependent variable: CAR(0,1)
Estimator: OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS Median
regression
Control group: Closest TA
matches
Closest PS
matches
Closest 3 TA matches
Excluded: - - Price <1$ - - -
Winsorizing: 1% & 99% 1% & 99% 1% & 99% 0.5% & 99.5% 5% & 95% -
(1) (2) (3) (4)
CA HQ (d) -0.53* -0.96*** -0.62** -0.93*** -0.63*** -0.64***
(-1.88) (-4.96) (-2.67) (-3.91) (-3.52) (-2.71)
R2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01
N 810 792 1,186 1,233 1,233 1,233
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Table 4: Robustness tests: Control variables and alternative event dates
This table reports results from pooled ordinary least squares regressions of cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) on a dummy variable set
equal to one if a firm is headquartered in California (CA HQ (d)), a set of financial control variables, and industry fixed effects. In Columns 1
to 5, CARs are estimated over two-day windows that include the event date and the first day after (i.e., October 1 and 2). In Columns 6 and
7, CARs are estimated over two-day windows that include the day of the introduction of the law (January 3) and the day after. In Columns 8
and 9, CARs are estimated over two-day windows that include the day of the first Assembly vote (May 31) and the day after. In Columns 10
and 11, CARs are estimate over three-day windows that include the day of the Senate vote (August 29), the day of the second Assembly vote
(August 30), and the day after. Daily abnormal returns are computed as the observed return minus the predicted return from a market model
regression estimated over a 250-day estimation window that ends on Friday, September 21. As a proxy for the market return, we use the return
of a self-computed, value-weighted market index consisting of all sample firms. The sample comprises all firms in Compustat with a data entry
within one calendar year before September-end 2018, excluding utility and financial firms (SIC codes 4940-4949 and 6000-6999, respectively),
firms with missing information on the state in which it is headquartered, firms headquartered outside the US, firms with negative book value of
equity, firms with missing financial control variables, firms that only list American Depository Receipts, and firms without a listing on NYSE,
AMEX, or NASDAQ. We also require at least 125 daily return observations during the 250-day estimation window and complete return data
for the entire five-day event window around the event date (October 1). For each California-headquartered sample firm, the three closest firms
in terms of size that are active in the same two-digit SIC code industry are chosen as matched control firms. While the same firm may serve as
a matched control firm to more than one California-headquartered firm, every control firm is included only once in our sample. Standard errors
are clustered at the two-digit SIC code industry level in Columns 1, 2, and 6 to 9, at the 1-digit SIC code level in Column 3, at the three-digit
SIC code level in Column 4, and at the Fama-French 48 industry level in Column 5. The CARs and all financial ratios are winsorized at the
1st and 99th percentiles. All regressions include an intercept, which is not shown for brevity. Detailed variable definitions are in the Appendix.
*, **, and ***, indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
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Dependent
variable:
CAR(0,1) CAR(January 3-4) CAR(May 31-June 1) CAR(August 29-31)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
CA HQ (d) -0.64** -0.63** -0.66** -0.60** -0.51* 0.21 0.19 0.43 0.37 0.38 0.40
(-2.64) (-2.70) (-3.09) (-2.22) (-1.78) (0.65) (0.57) (1.52) (1.29) (1.20) (1.25)
ROA 0.29 0.38 0.28 0.39 0.34 1.67*** 1.64*** 1.48* 1.30 0.31 0.55
(0.30) (0.35) (0.26) (0.41) (0.41) (3.64) (2.89) (1.79) (1.42) (0.39) (0.68)
Leverage 1.70** 1.35* 1.58* 1.03 1.26* 0.95 0.81 0.36 0.78 -0.85 -0.83
(2.30) (1.89) (2.07) (1.20) (1.84) (1.59) (1.45) (0.28) (0.58) (-1.24) (-1.18)
ln(Total assets) 0.05 0.04 0.08 0.04 0.02 -0.02 0.00 -0.14 -0.15* -0.17** -0.12
(0.62) (0.49) (1.19) (0.60) (0.25) (-0.29) (0.01) (-1.65) (-1.78) (-2.05) (-1.20)
PPE / TA 1.65 1.40 1.82 0.85 0.82 -0.41 -0.69 -0.32 -0.15 -0.28 -0.67
(1.45) (1.05) (1.33) (0.51) (0.64) (-0.56) (-0.91) (-0.52) (-0.18) (-0.18) (-0.40)
R&D / TA -0.15 0.41 0.25 0.76 0.58 4.61*** 5.22*** 2.51** 2.31** 1.71** 1.30
(-0.15) (0.56) (0.59) (0.71) (0.52) (5.76) (4.88) (2.59) (2.09) (2.23) (1.61)
Industry FEs - 2-SIC 1-SIC 3-SIC FF48 - 2-SIC - 2-SIC - 2-SIC
R2 0.02 0.09 0.04 0.14 0.08 0.02 0.05 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.03
N 1,233 1,233 1,233 1,233 1,233 1,185 1,185 1,221 1,221 1,230 1,230
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Table 5: Difference-in-differences estimates using daily abnormal returns
This table reports results from pooled ordinary least squares regressions of daily abnormal returns (ARs) on
a dummy variable set equal to one if a firm is headquartered in California (CA HQ (d)), a dummy set equal
to one for observations measured after the implementation of the quota (Post (d)), and an interaction term
between these two variables. The regression shown in Column 2 additionally includes industry fixed effects
based on two-digit SIC codes, Column 3 additionally includes financial controls, and Column 4 includes
firm fixed effects. The sample comprises four daily abnornmal stock return observations per firm, two
before and two after the introduction of the quota. Daily abnormal returns are computed as the observed
return minus the predicted return from a market model regression estimated over a 250-day estimation
window that ends on Friday, September 21. As a proxy for the market return, we use the return of a
self-computed, value-weighted market index consisting of all sample firms. The sample comprises all firms
in Compustat with a data entry within one calendar year before September-end 2018, excluding utility
and financial firms (SIC codes 4940-4949 and 6000-6999, respectively), firms with missing information on
the state in which it is headquartered, firms headquartered outside the US, firms with negative book value
of equity, firms with missing financial control variables, firms that only list American Depository Receipts,
and firms without a listing on NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ. We also require at least 125 daily return
observations during the 250-day estimation window and complete return data for the entire five-day event
window around the event date (October 1). For each firm headquartered in California, we choose the three
closest firms in terms of size that are active in the same two-digit SIC code industry. While the same firm
may serve as a matched control firm to more than one California-headquartered firm, every control firm is
included only once in our sample. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. Daily abnormal returns
and all financial ratios are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. All regressions include an intercept,
which is not shown for brevity. Detailed variable definitions are in the Appendix. *, **, and ***, indicate
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Dependent variable: Daily ARs
(1) (2) (3) (4)
CA HQ (d) × Post (d) -0.39** -0.39** -0.39** -0.39*
(-2.19) (-2.18) (-2.18) (-1.90)
Post (d) -0.62*** -0.62*** -0.62*** -0.62***
(-5.64) (-5.63) (-5.62) (-4.89)
CA HQ (d) -0.02 0.01 0.04
(-0.15) (0.09) (0.27)
ROA 0.61**
(1.97)
Leverage 0.06
(0.25)
ln(Total assets) 0.05*
(1.70)
PPE / TA 0.42
(0.91)
R&D / TA 0.27
(0.48)
Industry FEs - 2-SIC 2-SIC -
Firm FEs No No No Yes
R2 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.30
N 4,932 4,932 4,932 4,932
Firms 1,233 1,233 1,233 1,233
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Table 6: Robustness test: Accounting for the cross-sectional dependence of
returns
This table reports cumulative abnormal stock returns for two portfolios, one comprising California-headquartered
firms (CA HQ (d) = 1) and the other comprising a sample of industry- and size-matched non-California-
headquartered firms (CA HQ (d) = 0). The estimate for the daily abnormal return AR is obtained from
estimating the following regression:
rt = α+ARdt + βrwt + t
where rt is the daily equally-weighted portfolio return of all portfolio firms in excess of the 1-month
US treasury bill rate, dt is a dummy variable set equal to one for observations in the event window
and zero for observations in the estimation window, and rwt is the daily value-weighted market index
return in excess of the 1-month US treasury bill rate. As a proxy for the market return, we use the
return of a self-computed, value-weighted market index consisting of all sample firms. The regression is
estimated over a sample that includes all observations from the 250-day estimation window that ends on
September 21 and the event window. Estimates for the cumulative abnormal returns are obtained by
multiplying the obtained coefficient for AR by the number of days in the event window. Differences in
abnormal returns between California-headquartered and non-California-headquartered firms are obtained
from estimating the regression above but with the dependent variable being the daily difference in portfolio
returns of California-headquartered and non-California-headquartered firms. The sample comprises all
firms in Compustat with a data entry within one calendar year before September-end 2018, excluding utility
and financial firms (SIC codes 4940-4949 and 6000-6999, respectively), firms with missing information on
the state in which it is headquartered, firms headquartered outside the US, firms with negative book value
of equity, firms with missing financial control variables, firms that only list American Depository Receipts,
and firms without a listing on NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ. We also require at least 125 daily return
observations during the 250-day estimation window and complete return data for the entire five-day event
window around the event date (October 1). For each firm headquartered in California, we choose the three
closest firms in terms of size that are active in the same two-digit SIC code industry. While the same firm
may serve as a matched control firm to more than one California-headquartered firm, every control firm
is included only once in our sample. Detailed variable definitions are in the Appendix. *, **, and ***,
indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
CA HQ (d) = 1 CA HQ (d) = 0 Differences
Mean t-value Firms Mean t-value Firms Mean t-value
AR (0) -1.26%** -2.56 456 -0.82%** -2.05 777 -0.44%* -1.80
AR (1) -0.94%* -1.90 456 -0.63% -1.57 777 -0.31% -1.26
CAR (0,1) -2.20%*** -3.15 456 -1.44%** -2.56 777 -0.76%** -2.16
CAR (-1,1) -2.16%** -2.50 456 -1.39%** -1.99 777 -0.77%* -1.80
CAR (0,2) -1.53%* -1.75 456 -0.62% -0.87 777 -0.91%** -2.12
CAR (-2,2) -1.67% -1.48 456 -0.71% -0.77 777 -0.97%* -1.74
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Table 7: Cross-sectional tests: Quota compliance and female board represen-
tation
This table reports results from pooled ordinary least squares regressions of two-day cumulative abnormal
returns (CARs) on a dummy variable set equal to one if a firm is headquartered in California (CA HQ (d)),
a variable related to quota compliance or female board representation, and an interaction term between
these two. Daily abnormal returns are computed as the observed return minus the predicted return from
a market model regression estimated over a 250-day estimation window that ends on Friday, September
21. As a proxy for the market return, we use the return of a self-computed, value-weighted market index
consisting of all sample firms. The sample comprises all firms in Compustat with a data entry within
one calendar year before September-end 2018, excluding utility and financial firms (SIC codes 4940-4949
and 6000-6999, respectively), firms with missing information on the state in which it is headquartered,
firms headquartered outside the US, firms with negative book value of equity, firms with missing financial
control variables, firms that only list American Depository Receipts, and firms without a listing on NYSE,
AMEX, or NASDAQ. We also require at least 125 daily return observations during the 250-day estimation
window and complete return data for the entire five-day event window around the event date (October 1).
For each firm headquartered in California, we choose the three closest firms in terms of size that are active
in the same two-digit SIC code industry. While the same firm may serve as a matched control firm to more
than one California-headquartered firm, every control firm is included only once in our sample. Standard
errors are clustered at the two-digit SIC code level. Cumulative abnormal returns are winsorized at the
1st and 99th percentiles. All regressions include an intercept, which is not shown for brevity. Detailed
variable definitions are in the Appendix. *, **, and ***, indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%,
and 1% level, respectively.
Dependent variable: CAR(0,1)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
CA HQ (d) 1.56** 0.13 0.24 -1.33***
(2.07) (0.26) (0.52) (-3.30)
CA HQ (d) × 2021 requ. failed (d) -2.58***
(-3.89)
2021 requ. failed (d) 0.51
(1.30)
CA HQ (d) × # female directors missing -0.52*
(-1.83)
# female directors missing 0.04
(0.22)
CA HQ (d) × Shortfall (%) -4.12**
(-2.28)
Shortfall (%) 0.78
(0.75)
CA HQ (d) × Female directors (%) 4.13*
(1.93)
Female directors (%) -1.63
(-1.49)
R2 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
N 1,230 1,230 1,230 1,230
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Table 8: Cross-sectional tests: Firm size and corporate governance
This table reports results from pooled ordinary least squares regressions of two-day cumulative abnormal
returns (CARs) on a dummy variable set equal to one if a firm is headquartered in California (CA HQ
(d)), a variable related to firm size or corporate governance, and an interaction term between these two.
Daily abnormal returns are computed as the observed return minus the predicted return from a market
model regression estimated over a 250-day estimation window that ends on Friday, September 21. As a
proxy for the market return, we use the return of a self-computed, value-weighted market index consisting
of all sample firms. The sample comprises all firms in Compustat with a data entry within one calendar
year before September-end 2018, excluding utility and financial firms (SIC codes 4940-4949 and 6000-6999,
respectively), firms with missing information on the state in which it is headquartered, firms headquartered
outside the US, firms with negative book value of equity, firms with missing financial control variables,
firms that only list American Depository Receipts, and firms without a listing on NYSE, AMEX, or
NASDAQ. We also require at least 125 daily return observations during the 250-day estimation window
and complete return data for the entire five-day event window around the event date (October 1). For
each firm headquartered in California, we choose the three closest firms in terms of size that are active in
the same two-digit SIC code industry. While the same firm may serve as a matched control firm to more
than one California-headquartered firm, every control firm is included only once in our sample. Standard
errors are clustered at the two-digit SIC code level. Cumulative abnormal returns are winsorized at the
1st and 99th percentiles. All regressions include an intercept, which is not shown for brevity. Detailed
variable definitions are in the Appendix. *, **, and ***, indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%,
and 1% level, respectively.
Dependent variable: CAR(0,1)
(1) (2) (3)
CA HQ (d) -2.21*** -0.90*** 0.03
(-3.95) (-3.80) (0.06)
CA HQ (d) × ln(Total assets) 0.24***
(3.16)
ln(Total assets) 0.08
(0.99)
CA HQ (d) × Largest size quintile (d) 1.09**
(2.41)
Largest size quintile (d) 1.68***
(4.63)
CA HQ (d) × Modified E-Index -0.35**
(-2.21)
Modified E-Index -0.09
(-0.89)
R2 0.01 0.03 0.01
N 1,233 1,233 1,092
52
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3303798 
Table 9: Spillover effects to non-California-headquartered firms
This table reports results from pooled ordinary least squares regressions of two-day cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) on firm-specific
variables for a sample of non-California-headquartered firms. Firms in this sample are selected by choosing the three closest firms in terms of
size that are active in the same two-digit SIC code industry as the California-headquartered firms in our main sample. While the same firm may
serve as a matched control firm to more than one California-headquartered firm, every control firm is included only once in the sample. Daily
abnormal returns are computed as the observed return minus the predicted return from a market model regression estimated over a 250-day
estimation window that ends on Friday, September 21. As a proxy for the market return, we use the return of a self-computed, value-weighted
market index consisting of all sample firms. The sample comprises all firms in Compustat with a data entry within one calendar year before
September-end 2018, excluding utility and financial firms (SIC codes 4940-4949 and 6000-6999, respectively), firms with missing information
on the state in which it is headquartered, firms headquartered outside the US, firms with negative book value of equity, firms with missing
financial control variables, firms that only list American Depository Receipts, and firms without a listing on NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ. We
also require at least 125 daily return observations during the 250-day estimation window and complete return data for the entire five-day event
window around the event date (October 1). Standard errors are clustered at the two-digit SIC code level. Cumulative abnormal returns are
winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. All regressions include an intercept, which is not shown for brevity. Detailed variable definitions
are in the Appendix. *, **, and ***, indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
53
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3303798 
Dependent variable: CAR(0,1)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
ln(Missing female directors in industry in CA) -0.24*
(-1.76)
% missing female directors in industry in CA -5.18***
(-2.98)
Largest size quintile (d) × Female directors (%) 6.37**
(2.49)
Female directors (%) -3.42**
(-2.60)
Largest size quintile (d) 0.55
(0.68)
ln(Tenure female directors) 0.40**
(2.56)
% votes Democrats -4.05*
(-1.77)
% votes Republican 5.08**
(2.04)
Trump (d) 0.62*
(1.87)
R2 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00
N 777 774 775 548 777 777 777
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Table 10: Changes in female board representation around quota adoption
This table reports results from pooled ordinary least squares regressions of the fraction of female directors
on the board (Female directors (%)) on a dummy variable set equal to one if a firm is headquartered in Cal-
ifornia (CA HQ (d)), month dummy variables, and interaction terms between the California-headquarter
dummy and the month dummy variables. For each sample firm, we compute the fraction of female di-
rectors on the board for the end of September (the base month) as well as for the end of October and
November, respectively. The sample comprises all firms in Compustat with a data entry within one cal-
endar year before September-end 2018, excluding utility and financial firms (SIC codes 4940-4949 and
6000-6999, respectively), firms with missing information on the state in which it is headquartered, firms
headquartered outside the US, firms with negative book value of equity, firms with missing financial con-
trol variables, firms that only list American Depository Receipts, and firms without a listing on NYSE,
AMEX, or NASDAQ. We also require at least 125 daily return observations during the 250-day estimation
window that ends September 21 and complete return data for the entire five-day event window around
the event date (October 1). For each firm headquartered in California, we choose the three closest firms
in terms of size that are active in the same two-digit SIC code industry. While the same firm may serve
as a matched control firm to more than one California-headquartered firm, every control firm is included
only once in our sample. In Column 2, we restrict the sample to firms that require at least one additional
female director to fulfill the quota, and in Column 3, we restrict the sample to firms that require at least
two additional female directors to fulfill the quota. All regressions include firm fixed effects. Standard
errors are clustered at the firm level. Detailed variable definitions are in the Appendix. *, **, and ***,
indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Dependent variable: Female directors (%)
Sample: Full # female directors # female directors
missing > 0 missing > 1
(1) (2) (3)
CA HQ (d) × October-end (d) 0.19 0.34* 0.49**
(1.16) (1.96) (2.13)
CA HQ (d) × November-end (d) 0.36* 0.50** 0.55**
(1.82) (2.40) (2.03)
October-end (d) 0.22*** 0.21** 0.24**
(2.65) (2.34) (2.09)
November-end (d) 0.32*** 0.35*** 0.48***
(3.04) (3.26) (3.38)
Firm FEs Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.02 0.03 0.04
N 3,678 3,219 2,142
Firms 1,230 1,076 715
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Table 11: Director skills and experiences
This table reports results of tests for differences in means between the characteristics of different director subsets. Panel A reports descriptive
statistics and results of comparison tests of newly appointed and incumbent directors at California-headquartered firms in the time period
September 30 to November 30, 2018, for subsets of directors based on director gender. Panel B reports descriptive statistics and results of
comparison tests of newly appointed and leaving directors at California-headquartered firms in the time period September 30 to November
30, 2018, for subsets of directors based on director gender. The bottom rows display sample sizes. Characteristics of incoming directors are
determined as of the first day they are on the company’s board, for leaving directors as of the last day of their board membership, and as of the
last day of each sample month incumbent directors serve on a board. The sample comprises all firms headquartered in California in Compustat
with a data entry within one calendar year before September-end 2018, excluding utility and financial firms (SIC codes 4940-4949 and 6000-6999,
respectively), firms with negative book value of equity, firms with missing financial control variables, firms that only list American Depository
Receipts, and firms without a listing on NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ. We also require at least 125 daily return observations during the 250-day
estimation window that ends September 21 and complete return data for the entire five-day event window around the event date (October 1).
Detailed variable definitions are in the Appendix. *, **, and ***, indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
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Panel A: Newly appointed female directors vs. incumbent female and male directors
Newly appointed directors Incumbent directors Differences
Female Male Female Male (1) - (3) (1) - (4)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Age (yrs) 54.512 57.016 58.947 61.846 -4.435*** -2.73 -7.334*** -3.59
Outside director (d) 0.938 0.857 0.930 0.819 0.008 0.17 0.119* 1.74
Independent outside director (d) 0.700 0.639 0.928 0.915 -0.228*** -4.96 -0.215*** -4.28
Current CEO (d) 0.000 0.083 0.021 0.059 -0.021 -0.82 -0.059 -1.37
Current inside director (d) 0.033 0.056 0.029 0.073 0.005 0.16 -0.039 -0.83
Current C-level exec. (d) 0.167 0.167 0.088 0.097 0.078 1.53 0.069 1.29
Current VP-level exec. (d) 0.133 0.056 0.068 0.031 0.065 1.44 0.103*** 3.23
Connection to CEO (d) 0.097 0.028 0.141 0.180 -0.044 -0.72 -0.083 -1.21
Education (score) 2.875 2.762 2.853 2.779 0.022 0.13 0.096 0.52
Ivy League (d) 0.156 0.310 0.256 0.261 -0.100 -1.31 -0.105 -1.34
# different positions 4.188 4.786 4.099 4.210 0.089 0.15 -0.022 -0.03
# different firms 3.188 3.452 4.135 4.192 -0.947 -1.50 -1.004 -1.37
# different industries 3.531 3.476 3.961 3.561 -0.429 -0.74 -0.030 -0.05
Industry experience (d) 0.344 0.476 0.473 0.505 -0.129 -1.49 -0.162* -1.83
Director experience (d) 0.406 0.571 0.634 0.641 -0.228*** -2.72 -0.235*** -2.77
Outside director experience (d) 0.406 0.548 0.617 0.598 -0.211** -2.49 -0.192** -2.21
Number of directors 32 42 1,167 5,917 1,199 5,949
Number of outside directors 30 36 1,085 4,846 1,115 4,876
Number of firms 456 456 456 456 456 456
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Panel B: Newly appointed female directors vs. appointed male directors and newly appointed female vs. leaving female directors
Newly appointed directors Leaving directors Differences
Female Male Female Male (1) - (2) (1) - (3)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Age (yrs) 54.512 57.016 62.125 59.063 -2.504 -1.39 -7.613** -2.11
Outside director (d) 0.938 0.857 0.800 0.857 0.080 1.10 0.138 1.03
Independent outside director (d) 0.700 0.639 1.000 0.907 0.061 0.52 -0.300 -1.27
Current CEO (d) 0.000 0.083 0.000 0.037 -0.083 -1.63 0.000 0.00
Current inside director (d) 0.033 0.056 0.000 0.056 -0.022 -0.43 0.033 0.36
Current C-level exec. (d) 0.167 0.167 0.250 0.056 0.000 0.00 -0.083 -0.40
Current VP-level exec. (d) 0.133 0.056 0.000 0.000 0.078 1.09 0.133 0.76
Connection to CEO (d) 0.097 0.028 0.250 0.224 0.069 1.18 -0.153 -0.89
Education (score) 2.875 2.762 3.200 2.825 0.113 0.58 -0.325 -0.99
Ivy League (d) 0.156 0.310 0.600 0.317 -0.153 -1.53 -0.444** -2.35
# different positions 4.188 4.786 3.000 3.825 -0.598 -0.63 1.188 0.66
# different firms 3.188 3.452 5.800 3.746 -0.265 -0.39 -2.613* -1.78
# different industries 3.531 3.476 3.200 2.762 0.055 0.08 0.331 0.22
Industry experience (d) 0.344 0.476 0.400 0.476 -0.132 -1.14 -0.056 -0.24
Director experience (d) 0.406 0.571 0.800 0.667 -0.165 -1.41 -0.394 -1.66
Outside director experience (d) 0.406 0.548 0.800 0.635 -0.141 -1.20 -0.394 -1.66
Number of directors 32 42 5 63 74 37
Number of outside directors 30 36 4 54 66 34
Number of firms 456 456 456 456 456 456
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Appendix: Variable definitions
This table reports variable definitions of all variables used in the paper as well as their data sources. Database mnemonics are in italics.
Panel A: Firm characteristics
Variable Definition Source
CA HQ (d) Dummy variable equal to one if a firm is headquartered (state) in California as of September-end
2018, zero otherwise.
Compustat
AR(t) Abnormal return on day t, where October 1, 2018, marks the event date (t = 0). Daily abnormal
returns are calculated as the observed return minus a predicted return. Except if otherwise noted,
the predicted return is estimated using a market model regression where daily returns (adjusted for
distributions and stock splits) are regressed on daily value-weighted index returns over a 180-day
estimation window that ends six trading days prior to the event (September 21). At least 90 daily
observations with non-missing stock and index return data are required. Winsorized at the 1% and
99% level.
Compustat
CAR(t1,t2) Cumulative abnormal return, estimated as the sum of daily (unwinsorized) abnormal returns (AR)
from t1 to t2 where October 1, 2018 marks the event date. Winsorized at the 1% and 99% level.
Compustat
ROA Operating income before depreciation scaled by total assets (oibdp / at), winsorized at the 1% and
99% level.
Compustat
Leverage Long-term debt and debt in current liabilities scaled by total assets ((dltt + dlc) / at), winsorized at
the 1% and 99% level.
Compustat
Total assets Total assets (at). Compustat
PPE / TA Property, plant, and equipment scaled by total assets (ppent / at), winsorized at the 1% and 99%
level.
Compustat
R&D / TA Research and development expenses scaled by total assets (xrd / at). Set to zero if xrd is missing in
Compustat, winsorized at the 1% and 99% level.
Compustat
Board size Number of directors on the board. BoardEx
Female directors (%) Fraction of directors on the board that are female. BoardEx
Female inside directors (%) Number of female inside directors to all inside directors on the board. BoardEx
Female outside directors (%) Number of female outside directors to all outside directors on the board. BoardEx
2021 requ. failed (d) Dummy variable equal to one if a firm fails to comply with the 2021 female director requirements of
Senate Bill No. 826, that is, a firm does not have three female directors if board size is six or more,
two female directors if board size is five, and one female director if board size is four or less, zero
otherwise.
BoardEx
# female directors missing Number of female directors necessary to fulfill the 2021 female director requirements of Senate Bill
No. 826, that is, 3 minus the current number of female directors if board size is six or more, two
minus the current number of female directors if board size is five, and 1 minus the current number of
female directors if board size is four or less.
BoardEx
Shortfall (%) # female directors missing scaled by board size. BoardEx
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Largest size quintile (d) Dummy variable equal to one if a firm is in the highest Total asset quintile, zero otherwise. Compustat
Modified E-Index Score variable that adds one for each of the following five provisions in place as of September 30,
2018: Existance of a poison pill, existance of a staggered board, existance of a supermajority vote
requirement to amend the bylaws, existance of a supermajority vote requirement to amend the char-
ter, existance of a supermajority vote requirement for mergers. We disregard golden parachutes as
the sixth provision of Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell’s (2009) E-Index because it is not available in
SharkRepellent.
Shark-
Repellent
Missing female directors in
industry in CA
Sum of # female directors missing across all CA-headquartered firms in two-digit SIC code industry. Compustat/
BoardEx
% missing female directors
in industry in CA
Sum of # female directors missing across all CA-headquartered firms in two-digit SIC code industry
scaled by the sum of # female directors missing across all firms in two-digit SIC code industry.
Compustat/
BoardEx
% votes Democrats Fraction of votes obtained by Democratic Party in 2016 Presidential Election in the state of a com-
pany’s headquarter.
Politico
% votes Republican Fraction of votes obtained by Republican Party in 2016 Presidential Election in the state of a com-
pany’s headquarter.
Politico
Trump (d) Dummy variable equal to one if the state of a company’s headquarter was won by the Republican
Party in the 2016 Presidential Election.
Politico
Tenure female directors Mean tenure in years of all female directors on the board. Set to missing if firm has no female director. BoardEx
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Panel B: Director characteristics
Variable Definition Source
Female (d) Dummy variable equal to one if a director’s gender (gender) is female, zero if male. BoardEx
Age (yrs) Years passed since the date of birth (dob). If only month and year of dob is available, we use the 15th
of a given month, if only the year of dob is available, we use July 1st of a given year.
BoardEx
Outside director (d) Dummy variable equal to one if a director is an outside director (ned), zero if not. BoardEx
Independent outside
director (d)
Dummy variable equal to one if an outside director is independent (rolename), zero if not. BoardEx
Current CEO (d) Dummy variable equal to one if an outside director serves as a CEO of another listed firm, 2018, and
zero otherwise.
BoardEx
Current inside director (d) Dummy variable equal to one if an outside serves as an inside director of another listed firm, and
zero otherwise.
BoardEx
Current C-level exec. (d) Dummy variable equal to one if an outside serves as a C-level executive of another listed firm, and zero
otherwise. C-level executives include titles such as Chief Executive Officer, Chief Financial Officer,
Chief Operating Officer, etc.
BoardEx
Current VP-level exec. (d) Dummy variable equal to one if an outside director serves as a Vice President of another listed firm,
and zero otherwise. VP executives include Vice Presidents and Senior Vice Presidents.
BoardEx
Connection to CEO (d) Dummy variable equal to one if a director either has an education, an employment, or an other activity
connection to the CEO. An employment connection exists if a director has or had an overlapping work
engagement with the CEO at another listed firm. An education connection exists if a director and
the CEO are or were active (other rolename than "member") in the same social organization and zero
otherwise. An education connection exists if a director graduated within one year of the CEO from
the same university. For education connections, we disregard licenses (e.g., pilot license), leadership
programs (e.g., Harvard’s Advanced Management Program), certificates (e.g., CPA or CFA), and
honorary degrees. For degrees of the director and the CEO we require information on the degree year
and that both graduate with a degree from the respective program.
BoardEx
Education (score) Score variable that equals one if a director’s highest degree is below a Bachelor’s degree, two if the
highest degree is a Bachelor’s degree, three if the highest degree is a Master’s degree, four if the highest
degree is a PhD, and zero otherwise (Graham, Li, and Qiu, 2012). We disregard licenses (e.g., pilot
license), leadership programs (e.g., Harvard’s Advanced Management Program), certificates (e.g.,
CPA or CFA), and honorary degrees. We further require that a director graduates from a program
with a degree, attending a program is not sufficient.
BoardEx
Ivy League (d) Dummy variable equal to one if a director graduated from an Ivy League school and zero otherwise. BoardEx
# different positions Number of different positions at listed firms a director has experience in outside of the sample firm. BoardEx
# different firms Number of different listed firms a director has experience in besides the sample firm. BoardEx
# different industries Number of different four-digit SIC code industries a director has experience in outside of the sample
firm’s four-digit SIC industry.
BoardEx/
CRSP
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Tenure (yrs) Years passed between a given measurement date and the date of the first board appointment at the
sample firm.
BoardEx
Industry experience (d) Dummy variable equal to one if a director has experience at another listed firm that is active in the
same two-digit SIC code industry as the sample firm and zero otherwise.
BoardEx/
CRSP
Director experience (d) Dummy variable equal to one if a director has experience as a director of another listed firm and zero
otherwise.
BoardEx
Outside director experience
(d)
Dummy variable equal to one if a director has experience as an outside director of another listed firm
and zero otherwise.
BoardEx
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Table OA.1: Balancing tests
This table reports differences in firm characteristics between California-headquartered firms (CA HQ (d) = 1) and non-California-headquartered
US firms (CA HQ (d) = 0). The table reports means, medians, and the number of observations. The table also reports results from tests
for differences in means and medians in firm characteristics between the two subsamples. The sample comprises all firms in Compustat with
a data entry within one calendar year before September-end 2018, excluding utility and financial firms (SIC codes 4940-4949 and 6000-6999,
respectively), firms with missing information on the state in which it is headquartered, firms headquartered outside the US, firms with negative
book value of equity, firms with missing financial control variables, firms that only list American Depository Receipts, and firms without a
listing on NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ. We also require at least 125 daily return observations during the 250-day estimation window that ends
September 21 and complete return data for the entire five-day event window around the event date (October 1). Panel A shows balancing tests
for the resulting sample. Panel B shows balancing tests for a sample in which we draw, for each firm headquartered in California, the three
closest firms in terms of size that are active in the same two-digit SIC code industry. While the same firm may serve as a matched control firm
to more than one California-headquartered firm, every control firm is included only once in our sample. All financial ratios are winsorized at
the 1st and 99th percentiles. Detailed variable definitions are in the Appendix. *, **, and ***, indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%,
and 1% level, respectively.
Panel A: All non-CA headquartered firms
CA HQ (d) = 1 CA HQ (d) = 0 Differences
Mean Median N Mean Median N Mean t-value Median z-value
ROA -0.128 0.016 456 0.007 0.092 2,006 -0.135*** -8.41 -0.076*** -8.77
Leverage 0.168 0.115 456 0.233 0.219 2,006 -0.065*** -6.41 -0.104*** -6.59
Total assets 5,484.968 384.670 456 6,547.411 861.613 2,006 -1,062.442 -0.73 -476.943*** -6.32
PPE / TA 0.120 0.067 456 0.243 0.143 2,006 -0.123*** -9.96 -0.077*** -10.40
R&D / TA 0.166 0.100 456 0.065 0.001 2,006 0.101*** 12.57 0.099*** 15.59
Board size 7.666 8.000 455 8.213 8.000 2,000 -0.547*** -4.91 -0.000*** -4.80
Female directors (%) 0.146 0.143 455 0.155 0.143 2,000 -0.009 -1.30 -0.000 -1.25
2021 requ. failed (d) 0.888 1.000 455 0.829 1.000 2,000 0.059*** 3.12 0.000*** 3.12
# missing female directors 1.644 2.000 455 1.495 2.000 2,000 0.149** 2.52 0.000** 2.09
Shortfall (%) 0.235 0.250 455 0.210 0.222 2,000 0.026*** 3.05 0.028*** 3.02
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Panel B: Same two-digit SIC industry, closest 3 TA matches
CA HQ (d) = 1 CA HQ (d) = 0 Differences
Mean Median N Mean Median N Mean t-value Median z-value
ROA -0.132 0.016 456 -0.060 0.069 777 -0.071*** -3.26 -0.053*** -3.96
Leverage 0.168 0.115 456 0.187 0.140 777 -0.019* -1.70 -0.025* -1.80
Total assets 5,484.968 384.670 456 3,810.083 376.335 777 1,674.885 1.28 8.335 0.18
PPE / TA 0.120 0.067 456 0.151 0.090 777 -0.031*** -3.07 -0.024*** -3.31
R&D / TA 0.169 0.100 456 0.109 0.027 777 0.06*** 5.26 0.073*** 7.58
Board size 7.666 8.000 455 7.806 8.000 775 -0.141 -1.20 -0.000 -1.15
Female directors (%) 0.146 0.143 455 0.147 0.143 775 -0.000 -0.07 -0.000 -0.10
2021 requ. failed (d) 0.888 1.000 455 0.867 1.000 775 0.021 1.06 0.000 1.06
# missing female directors 1.644 2.000 455 1.590 2.000 775 0.054 0.87 0.000 0.68
Shortfall (%) 0.235 0.250 455 0.228 0.250 775 0.008 0.83 0.000 0.69
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Table OA.2: Univariate return differences
This table reports differences in abnormal returns between California-headquartered firms and US non-
California-headquartered firms around the quota adoption announcement. We report results from t-tests
against zero for different abnormal return measures for the subsample of firms headquartered in California
(CA HQ (d) = 1) and for the subsample of firms headquartered in any other US state but California (CA
HQ (d) = 0). Daily abnormal returns are computed as the observed return minus the predicted return from
a market model regression estimated over a 250-day estimation window that ends on Friday, September
21. As a proxy for the market return, we use the return of a self-computed, value-weighted market index
consisting of all sample firms. The sample comprises all firms in Compustat with a data entry within
one calendar year before September-end 2018, excluding utility and financial firms (SIC codes 4940-4949
and 6000-6999, respectively), firms with missing information on the state in which it is headquartered,
firms headquartered outside the US, firms with negative book value of equity, firms with missing financial
control variables, firms that only list American Depository Receipts, and firms without a listing on NYSE,
AMEX, or NASDAQ. We also require at least 125 daily return observations during the 250-day estimation
window and complete return data for the entire five-day event window around the event date (October
1). Panel A reports results from comparing abnormal return measures of California-headquartered firms
to a sample of matched non-California-headquartered firms. The matched sample is obtained by choosing
for each California-headquartered sample firm the three closest firms in terms of size that are active in
the same two-digit SIC code industry. While the same firm may serve as a matched control firm to
more than one California-headquartered firm, every control firm is included only once in our sample.
Panel B reports results from comparing abnormal return measures of California-headquartered firms to
all US non-California-headquartered firms. All abnormal return measures are winsorized at the 1st and
99th percentiles. Detailed variable definitions are in the Appendix. *, **, and ***, indicate statistical
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Panel A: Same two-digit SIC industry, closest 3 TA matches
CA HQ (d) = 1 CA HQ (d) = 0 Differences
Mean t-value N Mean t-value N Mean t-value
AR (0) -1.45%*** -9.74 456 -0.98%*** -7.86 777 -0.47%** -2.37
AR (1) -1.07%*** -7.63 456 -0.72%*** -6.31 777 -0.35%* -1.90
CAR (0,1) -2.48%*** -11.63 456 -1.73%*** -10.11 777 -0.75%*** -2.71
CAR (-1,1) -2.64%*** -9.99 456 -1.80%*** -8.55 777 -0.84%** -2.45
CAR (0,2) -1.87%*** -7.42 456 -0.87%*** -4.00 777 -1.01%*** -2.93
CAR (-2,2) -2.40%*** -7.03 456 -1.21%*** -4.53 777 -1.19%*** -2.73
Panel B: All non-CA headquarted firms as control firms
CA HQ (d) = 1 CA HQ (d) = 0 Differences
Mean t-value N Mean t-value N Mean t-value
AR (0) -1.45%*** -10.01 456 -0.87%*** -13.75 2,006 -0.58%*** -3.90
AR (1) -1.09%*** -8.07 456 -0.62%*** -10.56 2,006 -0.47%*** -3.37
CAR (0,1) -2.48%*** -11.77 456 -1.48%*** -16.18 2,006 -1.01%*** -4.65
CAR (-1,1) -2.61%*** -10.32 456 -1.49%*** -14.03 2,006 -1.12%*** -4.44
CAR (0,2) -1.88%*** -7.55 456 -0.77%*** -6.96 2,006 -1.11%*** -4.24
CAR (-2,2) -2.32%*** -7.27 456 -1.06%*** -7.85 2,006 -1.26%*** -3.93
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